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Abstract 
In 1995 and again in 2003, British Columbia's provincial legislature considered 
legislation called the "Community Charter". In the 1995 version, the legislation 
proposed "home rule", thereby strengthening the autonomy of British Columbia's 
local governments. However, the 1995 "Community Charter" failed to pass the 
legislature. In 2003 a different "Community Charter" was proposed that 
represented incremental policy change and minor autonomy increases when 
compared to the 1995 bill. This bill was passed and became the Community 
Charter. This thesis uses case study methodology to answer the question: What 
factors influenced the policy process between 1995 and 2003 such that local 
autonomy proposed in 1995 was eroded by 2003? Using the policy communities 
and networks approach, augmented with other public policy approaches, this 
thesis concludes that four major factors influenced the policy process to reduce 
the level of local autonomy in the final "Community Charter" in 2003. The factors 
were: the influence of the provincial ministry responsible for local governments, 
the influence of focused business organizations, macro-political changes and 
partisan political maneuvering. The greatest influence was from the ministry and 
business organizations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Local governments in Canada do not derive their authority from the direct 
collective actions of their citizens. Their authority comes from a reference in the 
Canadian constitution, which delegates power over local governments to the 
provincial legislatures.1 These provincially granted powers are prescriptive and 
narrowly defined. However, local autonomy, or the ability to act collectively for 
local benefit, is dynamic and requires wide authority to deal effectively with 
change.2 The inability to choose and perform local services and represent issues 
that affect the people of these local governments forms the backdrop for this 
thesis. 
Numerous reform movements have affected Canadian local government. 
In the early 20th century, the "Municipal Reform Movement" focused on structural 
changes to local governments to increase efficiency and reduce corruption.3 The 
structural changes included separating executive and legislative functions and 
granting the head of council more power to lead the organization.4 The next 
series of reforms in 1960s involved the establishment of large metropolitan 
jurisdictions designed to deliver services that were extra-territorial to the existing 
city boundaries but were regionally necessary.5 As mandated by the Canadian 
Constitution, each province dealt with these issues in their own manner. In British 
Columbia, the province established regional districts to act as both metropolitan 
Constitution Act, 1867, Section 92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws 
in relationship to Matters coming within the Classes of Subject next thereafter enumerated; (8) 
Municipal Institutions in the Province. Accessed 28/03/09 at 
http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/cons/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca_1867.html 
2Warren Magnusson, "Protecting the Right of Local Self-Govemment." Canadian 
Journal of Political Science. Vol. 38 no. 4 (2005), 901-2. 
3
 Richard Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1995), 51. 
4
 Tindal and Tindal, 54. 
5
 Tindal and Tindal, 89-148. 
governments and service providers for unincorporated areas.6 In the 1990s, 
reforms in the large urban areas included the amalgamation of smaller 
municipalities into mega-city governments, with Montreal and Toronto as the 
more notable examples.7 
The reforms of the 1990s in British Columbia involved updating the 
provincial legislative frameworks for local governments. Municipal statutes were 
slow to evolve with the changing political realities of the twentieth century. 
Incremental change had taken place, but by the 1990s local governments in 
British Columbia still did not have the authority to challenge the provincial 
government.8 Much of the existing local government legislation was under review 
by respective provincial authorities. Local governments suffered under a narrowly 
defined legislative authority that had not changed significantly since the early 
1900s. In response, these governments lobbied their provincial authorities for 
more legislative flexibility as a method of solving their modern challenges.9 
In 1991, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM), an 
association of local governments established a reform agenda entitled "Local 
Government and the Constitutions."™ This agenda included a proposal for 
constitutional recognition in the federal and provincial constitution and a local 
government Bill of Rights. At the time, these constitutional aspirations 
6
 Robert L. Bish and Eric G. Clemens, Local Government in British Columbia 3rd ed. (Richmond: 
University of British Columbia Municipalities, 1999), 39. 
7
 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government (Westmount: McGill-
Queen's Press, 2000), 7; Andrew Sancton, "Why Municipal Amalgamations: Halifax, Montreal, 
and Toronto." In Robert Young and Christian Leuprecht (Eds). Canada: The State of the 
Federation 2004. Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 
2006), 119. 
8
 Patrick Smith and Kennedy Stewart, "Local Whole-of-Govemment Policymaking in Vancouver." 
In RobertYoung and Christian Leuprecht (Eds). Canada: The State of the Federation 2004. 
Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 2006), 43. 
9
 Tindal and Tindal, 335-6. 
10
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, The First Century (Vancouver: Granville Island 
Publishing, 2006), 202-3. 
2 
represented local governments' desire for greater autonomy and recognition. 
However, over time the constitutional solution became unworkable due to the 
failure of the Charlottetown Accord, and the perceived lack of public support for 
further constitutional debates.11 The Charlottetown Accord's national 
constitutional debate had encouraged the UBCM and its national counterpart, the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, to lobby for constitutional change. The 
UBCM then turned to a provincially legislated solution and lobbied the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) provincial government (1991 to 2001) and the British 
Columbia Liberal provincial government (after 2001) for more autonomy.12 
In 1995, the political debate on the level of appropriate autonomy for local 
governments in British Columbia started with the introduction of Bill M222-
Community Charter.13 This bill represented a substantial change in the manner in 
which local governments could do business in British Columbia. For many years, 
local governments had called for changes to their prescriptive Municipal Act. The 
nature of the demands on local governments from their citizenry had changed. 
Cities were much larger, more complex and needed new methods of service 
delivery and financing. Bill M222 was a private member's bill introduced by the 
opposition Liberal party as a response to this long running debate. The 
legislation, however, did not pass, most likely because it was a private members 
bill. 
Through Bill M222, the Liberals were attempting to grant "home rule" to the 
province's local governments. This idea has had a long and unsuccessful history 
in British Columbia. In 1919, a "home rule" statute also failed to pass the 
11
 William A. Buholzer, The Community Charter: B.C. Local Government in Transition (Vancouver: 
Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 2005), 15. 
12
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities (2006), 202-220. 
13
 Bill M222-1995. Legislative Assembly of British Columbia (accessed 09/0/08) at: 
http ://www. leg. be. ca/35th4th/1 st_read/mem222-1. htm. 
3 
provincial legislature. Home rule refers to the arrangements of delegated 
authority that allow local governments to meet their constituents' needs as long 
as they are not in breach of existing federal or provincial law.14 This differs from 
the existing arrangement of local government powers derived from narrowly 
defined prescriptive legislation. 
When the Liberals came to power in 2001, they proposed and adopted a 
new piece of local government legislation. This was called Bill 14 - the 
Community Charter. Although similar in name, Bill 14 was substantially different 
from the earlier Community Charter, Bill M222. In fact, Bill 14 rescinded many of 
the more autonomous provisions of the earlier Bill M222 and added new 
requirements for provincial approvals. For example, municipalities now needed to 
obtain provincial approval or enter into provincial-municipal agreements in the five 
"spheres of concurrent authority." These spheres include wildlife, public health 
matters, soil deposit and removal, protection of the environment and building 
regulations. Under the existing Local Government Act, ministerial approval was 
ad hoc.15 Bill M222 did not use "spheres of concurrent authority" to differentiate 
authority. 
Another example of reduced autonomy under Bill 14 involves individual 
local government consultation rights. While these were articulated in Bill M222, 
Bill 14 changed to consultation with the UBCM, a provincial association. What 
was an individual right of each local government in Bill M222 had become a 
collective right of the UBCM, a provincial organization. This placed small northern 
and rural communities at the mercy of the large urban municipalities whose 
14
 Bish and Clemens, 18; Buholzer, 3. 
15
 Buholzer, 35. 
4 
interests and overwhelming numbers could make consultation about local matters 
difficult. 
It is against this backdrop that this thesis answers the question: what 
factors explain the changes from Bill M222-1995 to Bill 14-2004? The factors 
under examination include changes in the policy network membership, the 
relative political influence of certain policy actors, contextual changes in the policy 
environment, and changes to the nature of the policy problem. In order to 
determine the significance of these factors, the study will examine several related 
sub-questions: what affect does moving from opposition to government have on 
policy change? Can changes in the policy network and policy sub-system explain 
these policy changes? Moreover, can this case study generalize explanations for 
policy change when parties move from opposition to government? These 
questions speak to the very heart of our understanding of policymaking, the 
appropriate exercising of political power and its ultimate impact on policy 
outcomes. 
The local government policy community underwent a change in 
membership between 1995 and 2004. This resulted in a corresponding change in 
the influence certain policy actors or groups of actors had on the policymakers. In 
1995 the policy community was an integrated group of actors. In 2001, two new 
entrants, one a part of the provincial government (Ministry of Community, 
Aboriginal and Women's Services) and the other resulting from the broadened 
policy process (Community Charter Business Coalition) joined the policy network. 
Both groups brought with them new ideas regarding the appropriate level of local 
government autonomy. The Ministry supported the idea of provincial oversight. 
The business coalition's ideas were concerned with their self-interest. The 
5 
policymakers were highly influenced by both groups. They reduced the autonomy 
first offered in Bill M222 to the incremental changes outlined in Bill 14. Other 
factors influenced the policymakers in the final Bill 14. The policy actors that 
developed Bill M222 were engaged in daily political maneuvering as members of 
the Official Opposition. In 2001, these same policy actors became policymakers 
following their electoral victory. To a certain extent, this influenced their ideas 
regarding the level of appropriate local government autonomy since they would 
now be accountable for any policy changes. 
This thesis will examine the transformation of local government legislation 
by focusing on changes to the policy communities that developed Bill M222 and 
Bill 14. How did changes to the policy communities that developed each bill 
influence the direction and content of the legislation? Scholars study policy 
processes to explain how and why politicians make certain policy decisions. 
Many explanatory approaches are used to examine the policy process. This 
thesis uses the policy networks and policy communities approach because of its 
focus on the policy actors, their behaviour, and their relationship to each other 
and the broader policy community. 
The policy networks approach focuses on the actors, ideas and interests to 
explain policy outcomes. These particular policy events are worthy of study 
because they present a unique set of circumstances. The policy actors 
advocating this legislation were consistent over the nine years under 
investigation; however, their attitudes changed regarding local autonomy. By 
holding one set of political variables constant, it is much easier to look for other 
independent variables to explain policy changes. 
6 
The research data includes primary source documents from government 
documentation and policy network participants and secondary source information 
from the literature. Elite interviews took place using semi-structured interview 
techniques. This technique involves asking the same questions to all 
interviewees. In some cases, specific participant responses prompted follow-up 
questions. This data defined the variables used to explain these political events. 
Chapter 2 reviews the academic sources on public policy development and 
change, local government reform, and legislative reform involving local 
governments in British Columbia. Chapter 3 outlines the study's research 
methodology, including the policy communities approach and the use of case 
study for research. This chapter also reviews the method of research data 
collection and compilation, and concludes with a discussion of ethical issues 
management. Chapter 4 presents evidence and research findings regarding 
changes to Bill M222. This chronological story explains the circumstances, 
influences and actions of the policy actors involved. Evidence regarding other 
factors is included in this history. Chapter 5 analyses the evidence presented in 
chapter 4 and provides answers to the thesis question: what factors explain the 
changes in the two pieces of legislation under examination? Using the policy 
networks approach, the thesis outlines the constellation of actors who influenced 
the policymakers and their motivations for doing so. The study concludes that 
four main factors influenced the policymakers to reduce local government 
autonomy. These factors include new entrants to the policy community, changing 
macro-political circumstances resulting in changes to the policy problem, 
institutional changes resulting from the election of a new government and 
partisan political maneuvering. The factors are also ranked regarding the efficacy 
7 
of their influence. The two new entrants to the policy community, the Ministry and 
business interests, ranked highest regarding influence on the policymakers. The 
other factors had less influence. 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Historical Overview 
The development of local governments in Canada started with the grant of 
Royal Charters to a number of growing cities in the 1700's. These charter cities 
used the authority of the Royal Crown to deliver local services and represent the 
interests of the city's citizens.16 The debate surrounding local government 
autonomy in post colonial Canada, dates back to the British North America 
(BNA) Act. Canada's founding constitutional document did not include direct 
constitutional authority for local governments. 
After substantial debate between Canada's colonial authorities and the 
British government, provincial legislatures obtained constitutional authority over 
local governments. In practice, this means that all local governments in Canada 
are "creatures" of their provincial legislatures.17 In other words, provincial 
legislatures must grant local governments their powers to act collectively through 
provincial statutes. The provinces have adopted different strategies for granting 
local governments' their powers to act. Such strategies range from enacting 
volumes of prescriptive and detailed statues limiting local government action, to 
the granting of broadly interpreted residual powers commonly called "home 
rule".18 Home rule has come to represent the symbolic goal for proponents of 
local government autonomy. 
Home rule is the granting of statutory authority to do what is necessary to 
deliver local governance, provided the local government does not legislate in 
16
 Tindal and Tindal, 37. 
17
 Magnusson, 907. 
18
 Bish and Clemens, 18; Buholzer, 3. 
9 
conflict with federal or provincial statues.19 It also involves the granting of 
residual provincial powers to local governments. Residual statutory powers are 
non-prescriptive powers defined broadly as provincial jurisdictions not actively 
used.20 A current example of a local government's ability to use residual power is 
the authority to enact a local road tax on municipal roads where the provincial 
and federal governments have left this specific authority vacant. Although there 
are no home rule municipalities in Canada, numerous home rule municipalities 
still operate in the western United States of America.21 In British Columbia, an 
attempt to establish municipal home rule failed to obtain a majority vote in the 
1919 provincial legislature.22 
In Canada, provincial legislatures chose to follow the prescriptive 
legislative method resulting in municipal statutes that prescribe specific authority 
to local governments. In keeping with this prescriptive legislative approach, the 
new Province of British Columbia enacted the "Consolidated Municipal Act" in 
1871, followed in 1892 with the "Municipal Clauses Act", which was modeled after 
Ontario's "Baldwin Act", the parent of all Canadian municipal legislation.23 British 
Columbia's municipal legislation evolved slowly, with small incremental changes 
until the late 1990's, when the autonomy debate reignited with national 
discussions of constitutional reform. To this day, the debate about local autonomy 
continues to animate Canadian politics, as provincial and local governments seek 
to determine the appropriate balance between provincial control and delegated 
local authority. As Tindal and Tindal state "[tjhese [historical] arrangements 
19
 Bish and Clemens, 18. 
20
 Donald Lidstone, "Communities in an Urban Century." Paper presented at a symposium on 
Municipal Autonomy, Toronto, Ontario, October 20, 2001. 
21
 Buholzer, 3. 
22
 Bish and Clemens, 18. 
23
 Tindal and Tindal, 37. 
10 
contributed to the strong tradition of [and desire for] local autonomy that 
continues to characterize municipal government in British Columbia."24 
An historical understanding of the evolution of British Columbia's local 
government authority informs the context for this local government autonomy 
debate. From 1870 to 1920, there was a tradition of "chartered" municipal 
governments in British Columbia. Charters outlined the specific authority granted 
to a local government. Citizens drafted municipal charters that became private 
member's bills and were adopted by the provincial legislature.25 All but one of 
these charter municipalities converted to Municipal Act incorporations. No 
reference respecting the reason for this conversion from charter municipality to 
Municipal Act incorporation is available. The likely explanation is that the 
provincial legislature was less inclined to adopt a new municipal charter through a 
private member's bill after the failure of the home rule vote of 1919.26 
Only the City of Vancouver has its original charter. The Vancouver Charter 
is a provincial statute in form; however, it retains some of its extraordinary 
authority from the past. For example, the Charter allows the City of Vancouver to 
retain its protection against building code liabilities. No other municipality in 
British Columbia has similar liability protection under present municipal 
legislation.27 The Vancouver Charter is a more autonomous piece of provincial 
legislation than the present and newly enacted "Community Charter". However, 
24
 Tindal and Tindal, 37. 
25
 Tindal and Tindal, 37. 
26
 An alternative explanation may be the reluctance for majority governments to support private 
member's bills, as is the case today; Bish and Clemens, 10. 
27
 The City of Vancouver has statutory protection against leaky condominium damage claims. 
Condominium owners sued the municipality of Delta, a municipality without Vancouver's charter 
protection, for millions of dollars because condominiums built in Delta were not watertight. This 
example highlights the benefits of more autonomous legislation for the local taxpayers funding the 
operations of their local governments;"Municipalities shouldn't shirk leaky condo blame" 
Vancouver Sun, Dec. 23, 2002. A14; Nelson Bennett "Leaky condo ruling inconclusive." Nanaimo 
Daily News, September 21, 2002. 
11 
the Vancouver Charter does not constitute home rule. The Vancouver Charter 
represents a symbolic statutory arrangement viewed by other British Columbia 
municipalities as more advantageous than present municipal authority, as 
outlined in the Community Charter.28 Discussions of the history of chartered 
municipalities in British Columbia help explain the present autonomy debate 
regarding the "new Community Charter". Historic circumstances have led to the 
present evolution in British Columbia's local government autonomy. 
One significant part of British Columbia's political context is that local 
governments are the "farm teams" for provincial party politics. Many of the MLA's 
in the provincial legislature, in both major parties, cut their political teeth as local 
government elected officials. This would suggest they would have a bias towards 
and understanding of the issues and challenges facing local governments. 
Successive provincial governments, however, have consistently rejected 
substantial increases in local government autonomy regardless of the party in 
power and opted instead for incremental change. 
The present political debate regarding local government autonomy 
involves a number of political variables. These include: senior government deficit 
financing partly caused by increased public service demands, talk of 
constitutional reform, partisan maneuvering by opposition and governing parties 
and the ongoing desire by local governments for more autonomy. The following 
explanation of each of these circumstances helps explain the overall debate. 
The financial problems facing the provinces in the 1990s meant that many 
provincial governments could not balance growing service demands with their 
financial capacities and subsequently borrowed heavily to maintain service 
Buholzer, 4. 
12 
levels. Municipalities were also experiencing excessive public service demands 
and financial limitations, as well as a lack of formal authority to deal with these 
challenges. In an attempt to balance their budgets, provincial governments 
embarked on a process of reducing provincial grants to local governments and 
downloading service responsibilities without the additional delegated revenue 
sources. During the 1980's and 1990's discussions regarding local autonomy 
were framed by local governments' inability to manage these newly downloaded 
provincial services in the context of their own weaker financial circumstances and 
limited legal authority.30 
At this time, the debate around local government autonomy intensified 
because of the efforts to reform the Canadian Constitution. Starting in the 1980's 
with the national discussion on constitutional reform, local governments across 
Canada lobbied their provincial and federal governments for more flexible powers 
to act on many local matters. The theory is that the constitutionalized 
decentralization of political authority would increase service delivery efficiency 
through the reduction of bureaucratic barriers and senior government approvals. 
This would provide local governments with the freedom to act more innovatively 
to solve their local problems.31 
In most provinces in Canada, citizen expectations of local governments 
had also changed and provincial legislatures had the constitutional powers to 
respond to these expectations. For example, changing local behavior could solve 
29
 Tindal and Tindal, 75-80, 332-333. 
30
 Donald Lidstone, "Future of Local Self Government." Paper presented at the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities/International Union of Local Authorities Forum, "Cities of Tomorrow", 
Toronto, November 22, 1996 
31
 Patrick J Smith and Kennedy Stewart, "Local Government Reform in British Columbia, 1991 -
2005: One Oar in the Water." In J.Garcea and E. C.LeSage Jr (Eds). Municipal Reform in Canada 
Reconfiguration, Re-Empowerment and Rebalancing (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
25. 
13 
many macro-environmental issues. The slogan "think globally: act locally" 
describes one method of addressing issues such as global climate change. 
However, the fact that senior governments control the policy regimes that might 
address global climate change reduces the ability of local governments to mount 
collective local policies to ameliorate the effects of these changes. In any 
proposal to increase local agricultural production local governments are frustrated 
because most agricultural regulations are managed at the provincial and federal 
levels, and it can take years to make locally necessary policy changes. Local 
governments see issues such as climate change as requiring meaningful and 
timely responses to emerging policy problems. Provincial legislatures were and 
continue to be slow and ineffective in responding to these changing policy 
demands.32 Given that local governments could not practically rely on provincial 
legislatures to grant the timely authority to solve their problems, they looked to 
their provincial organization to lobby for constitutional change.33 
In British Columbia, discussions regarding local government autonomy 
intensified at the 1991 UBCM convention when the UBCM presented an agenda 
for local government legislative reform to its membership.34 In a policy paper 
entitled "Local Government and the Constitutions" Gordon Campbell, then UBCM 
First Vice President, described the paper as a "Bill of Rights" for local 
governments.35 Campbell advocated for "a new relationship... between the 
32
 Donald Lidstone, "The Future of Local Self-Govemment." The Advocate 55 (1997), 101. 
33
 Notwithstanding Smith and Stewart's assertion that "whole-of-government" policy solutions are 
possible for local governments without formal authority. "Whole-of-government" policy solutions 
take place when local governments take public leadership on matters that they have the clear 
legislative authority for or that authority rests with another level of government. The City of 
Vancouver's safe injection site initiative is an example of this type of local government policy 
response. The constitutional authority for this initiative is provincial and federal. 
34
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, Minutes of the Annual Convention, September 
18,1991,63. 
35
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, Local Government And The Constitutions, Appendix F, 
63. 
14 
Province and municipalities... that would make for better, more cost-effective, 
service delivery."36 
The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the UBCM's national 
counterpart, believed that the public debate and pending national referendum 
regarding the Charlottetown Accord had presented the possibility of amending the 
Canadian Constitution to include local governments as a distinct order of 
government.37 Many local government politicians at the time supported amending 
the constitutions to include local government rights. This would have granted 
constitutional recognition to local governments as an order of government.38 The 
Charlottetown Accord did not specifically mention local governments, but the 
constitutional debate surrounding the Accord was a convenient platform to raise 
the issue of local government autonomy because the Accord included the 
opportunity to create sovereign sub-groups. For example, aboriginal rights were 
included in the Accord. Nothing came of these local government constitutional 
discussions as a result of the failure of the Charlottetown Accord in October 1992. 
Constitutional recognition would have permitted local governments to solve 
their own service demands by enacting local laws and regulatory regimes within 
their boundaries without requiring a specific provincial authority. For example, 
local road tolls or local fuel taxes are effective regulatory regimes for financing 
roadway construction, but are not available to local governments under the 
3b
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, (2006), 202-3; The Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities is a lobby organization made up of all British Columbia's incorporated 
municipalities. It meets annually to debate resolutions directed toward the provincial and federal 
governments. The resolutions are formulated by individual local governments, vetted by one of 
five area associations, debated by the full assembly and if approved they are forwarded to the 
province for their consideration. By choice, all municipalities and regional districts are members of 
the association. 
37
 The Charlottetown Accord was a package of constitutional amendments proposed by the 
federal and provincial governments in 1992. The accord failed in a national referendum in October 
1992; Richard Johnson,"An Inverted Logroll :The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum" PS: 
Political Science and Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1993), 43-48. 
38
 Buholzer, 5. 
15 
present constitutional arrangement. The authority to implement such a taxation 
arrangement rests with the provincial government alone. Local governments 
cannot establish a roadway tax regime without the specific authority granted by 
the provincial legislature. The granting of a broad constitutional authority would 
have changed the requirement for specific authority and permitted local 
governments their own taxation and regulatory policy regimes. This constitutional 
authority would have solved many of local government's service demands but 
may have caused a number of other unintended consequences and jurisdictional 
conflicts. 
Despite the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, local governments were 
still faced with ongoing and escalating public service demands. In British 
Columbia, they encouraged their provincial association, the UBCM, to press for 
other methods of gaining necessary autonomy to deal with these challenges. The 
UBCM reverted to a strategy of influencing provincial policymakers by 
encouraging incremental policy change to satisfy their 1991 reform policy 
agenda. The UBCM lobbied two different provincial governments representing 
two different political parties, during the 13-year period from 1991 to 2004. 
Ultimately, this reform agenda became the genesis for changes to municipal 
legislation resulting in the Local Government Act, Bill M222 and finally the 
Community Charter Bill 14 in 2004. 
Reviewing the Literature on Local Government 
Tindal and Tindal's Local Government in Canada is a comprehensive work 
on local government. The authors present a convincing argument that local 
government should perform two important democratic functions: "[a]ct as a 
political mechanism through which a local community can express its collective 
16 
objectives; and provide a variety of services and programs to local residents."' 
The argument made by many experts is that local government relegates itself to 
focusing on service delivery at the cost of the democratic imperative of local 
representation.40 As Tindal and Tindal argue: 
[w]here provincial authorities did encourage or ultimately impose 
municipal governments on the populace, it was not because of any 
apparent belief in the values of democracy - rather, it was motivated by a 
desire on the part of any provincial administrations to shift at least some of 
the growing burden of expenditures to the local level.41 
Tindal and Tindal conclude their volume on local government by suggesting there 
is "[m]ore demand and need for governance - for leading society and convincing 
its various interest groups to embrace common goals and strategies."42 
In recent years, matters pertaining to local government have received 
renewed attention by political scientists and public administration specialists. This 
literature falls generally into areas of interest associated with larger political 
events and trends that affect local governments. For example, a number of 
scholars have studied the municipal amalgamations in Toronto, Halifax and 
Montreal.43 Other issues of interest include Nakhaie Reza's study of electoral 
participation at the municipal level and Christopher Leo's work on urban regime 
39
 Tindal and Tindal, 3. 
40
 John A. Marshall and David J.A. Douglas, "The Evolution of Canadian Local Government.'The 
Viability of Canadian Municipalities: Concepts and Measures (Toronto: Campbell, Slatcher and 
Berry, 1997), 6. 
41
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 Joseph Kushner and David Siegal, "Effect of Municipal Amalgamations in Ontario on Political 
Representation and Accessibility," Canadian Journal of Political Science vol 36, no. 5 (2003); 
Sancton (2004). 
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theory that focuses on the rescaling of local governments to include non-local 
influences in their policy communities.44 
Others have focused on municipal reform, self-government, local 
autonomy and municipal-provincial-federal relationships. For example Joseph 
Garcea and Edward LeSage have written about Canadian municipal reform, 
Warren Magnusson has focused on local self-government and Robert Young and 
Christian Leuprecht have complied editions on municipal-provincial-federal 
relationships.45 In some cases, scholars have focused on municipal reform in 
specific provinces.46 Mary Louise McAllister, Warren Magnusson and others 
have written more generally on local government autonomy, democracy and self-
government.47 There appears to be a steady interest in the issue of local 
autonomy, in its various forms over the last 40 years. In his work on metropolitan 
governance, Andrew Sancton argued: 
Christopher Leo, "City Politics in an Era of Globalization." In Mikey Lauria (Ed). Reconstructing 
Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Local Government in a Global Economy (Sage, 1997), 77-98; 
Nakhaie Reza, "Electoral Participation in Municipal, Provincial and Federal Elections in Canada." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol 39, no. 2 (2006), 363-390. 
45Joseph Garcea and Edward C. LeSage (Eds), Municipal Reform in Canada: Reconfiguration, 
Re-empowerment, and Rebalancing (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2005); Robert Young 
and Christian Leuprecht, Canada: The State of the Federation 2004. Municipal-Federal-Provincial 
Re/af/on.(Kingston: Queen's University Press, 2006). 
46
 Nova Scotia see Ian Stewart, "The Dangers of Municipal Reform in Nova Scotia." In P.Clancy, 
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Nova Scotia (Halifax: Formac Publishing 2000.) 199-227; Ontario see David Siegel "Municipal 
Reform in Ontario: Revolutionary Evolution." In J.Garcea and E. C.LeSage Jr (Etis).Municipal 
Reform in Canada Reconfiguration, Re-Empowerment and Rebalancing (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 126-48; New Brunswick see Geoffrey R. Martin "Municipal Reform in New 
Brunswick: Minor Tinkering in Light of Major Problems." Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 41 no.1 
(2007), 75-99; British Columbia see Patrick J Smith and Kennedy Stewart, "Local Government 
Reform in British Columbia, 1991 -2005: One Oar in the Water." In J.Garcea and E. C.LeSage Jr 
(Eds). Municipal Reform in Canada Reconfiguration, Re-Empowerment and Rebalancing 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005); Saskatchewan see Joseph Garcea "Saskatchewan's 
Municipal Reform Agenda: Plethora of Processes and Proposals but Paucity of Products." In 
J.Garcea and E. C.LeSage Jr (Eds). Municipal Reform in Canada Reconfiguration, Re-
Empowerment and Rebalancing (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
47Magnusson, 901-2; Mary Louise McAllister, Governing Ourselves: The Politics of Canadian 
Communities (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 
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[A]t some point, probably in the 1960's, in most parts of Canada (but not 
BC) and in many other countries (but not in USA), there was increasing 
public acceptance that the central government legislature (provincial 
legislatures in Canada) could do what they wanted with municipal 
structures, even if the affected local citizens did not approve. This was a 
profound turning point for municipal government, one that we know very 
little about. We are still living through its implications for the meaning of 
local democratic self-government. 
Sancton later comments that "...[provincial governments-indeed, provincial 
premiers- were able to push through amalgamations because of their relatively 
autonomous position in the constitutional order."49 This thesis expands our 
understanding of the implications of provincial power over local autonomy. 
As Mary Louise McAllister states: "[a] distinction is drawn between the 
study of government, which focuses on formal structures of government, and the 
study of governance, which sees local politics as taking place beyond formal 
institutions and operating within society as a whole."50 The influences and 
pressures that come to bear on the two dependent variables, Bill M222 and Bill 
14 are far from narrow or formal. McAllister's definition of governance is evident 
in the pluralistic development of the two bills under examination, in particular the 
latter. 
For the purposes of this research, this thesis defines local government 
autonomy as the ability to solve local policy problems locally without the need for 
provincial legislative change or approval. The concept of local government 
autonomy is a continuum from constitutional authority at one end and prescriptive 
delegated authority on the other. Since the passage of Ontario's Baldwin Act, the 
Andrew Sancton, "Canadian Federalism." In Donald N. Rothblatt and Andrew Sancton (Eds). 
Metropolitan Governance: American Intergovernmental Perspectives (Berkeley: Institute of 
Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 1993), 275. 
49Sancton, 6. 
50
 Mary Louise McAllister, Governing Ourselves?: The Politics of Canadian Communities 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 12-13. 
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level of local government autonomy has increased incrementally along this 
continuum.51 
Patrick Smith, Victor Jones and Kennedy Stewart have written specifically 
about local governments and their levels of autonomy.52 They suggest there is a 
local government authority continuum from "home rule/charter" municipalities on 
one end to prescriptive delegation on the other.53 This thesis describes the failed 
attempt to move British Columbia's municipalities towards the "home rule/charter" 
end of that continuum. It further describes why this transformation failed. 
Warren Magnusson, a political theorist, explains the fear of local self-
government as the fear of the privatization of a public authority. He suggests that 
the present state of municipal authority and way we see that authority limits the 
potential inherent in municipal self-government.54 This thesis uses this point to 
help explain the motivations of some of the policy actors attracted to the policy 
network during the public discussion of the first draft of Bill 14. 
Robert Bish and Eric Clemens present a complete institutional explanation 
of British Columbia's local governments, their structural relationships to their 
provincial government, and the historical context in which local governments has 
evolved. Bish and Clemens characterize the provincial policymaking process 
affecting local government as a process whereby "[m]ajor policy changes and 
new legislation are often prepared completely within a provincial ministry...the net 
result is a policymaking process... [with] limited [outside] influence on 
51
 Smith and Stewart (2006), 254. 
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 Smith and Stewart (2006), 254; Victor Jones, "Beavers and Cats: Federal-Local Relations in 
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government decisions. The key interest groups highlighted by Bish and 
Clemens at the municipal level include the Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities, and the Municipal Officers Association, now referred to as the 
Local Government Management Association.56 There is little suggestion of other 
input to the policy process. We may conclude from this literature review that the 
local government network or sub-government has little diffuse input to the policy 
process.57 Since 1995, however, provincial governments have taken a different 
approach regarding municipal legislative reform. Their processes have been 
more open and pluralistic.58 
This case study considers a specific proposal to augment local 
government autonomy and tracks the evolution of this legislation. The case study 
illuminates how public policy is influenced, who influences it and why. These are 
important political matters in the study of public policy, local governments and 
local autonomy. The process of developing public policy is also important and 
needs further clarification in this review. 
To understand and explain the public policy events surrounding the 
changes that occurred in municipal legislation in British Columbia at the turn of 
the century, it is necessary to review the literature on public policy. Public policy 
has many theories and approaches which offer explanations about political 
phenomena. Many of these theories and approaches overlap, conflict, and 
contradict. This review is a selected presentation of these many approaches. It 
55
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focuses on the policy communities and policy networks approach and seeks to 
satisfy the criticisms of this approach by contrasting it with other explanations. 
Public Policy Explanatory Approaches 
Grace Skogstad and William Coleman investigate political institutions to 
explain the policy process.59 This approach involves an historical investigation of 
each policy actor. A policy actor is a person, organization, institution or group that 
acts to influence public policy. In this case study, actors include local 
governments, the provincial government, the UBCM, municipal officers 
associations, employee groups, other allied organizations, special interest groups 
(i.e. building, business and land development associations), academics, political 
parties, lobby organizations, provincial officials, interested individuals, the media, 
citizens and others. 
An investigation of policy actors uncovers the ideas, norms and values of 
each group or institution. In order to determine patterns of interaction and the 
differences in terms of influence between policy actors, scholars investigate the 
relationships between policy actors. Policy outcomes are the results of the policy 
process once the policymakers (those actors that have the authority to make 
policy decisions) have made their choices. Therefore, the actors that hold the 
greatest political power or influence will arguably exercise the greatest influence 
on policy outcomes. This thesis explains how some policy actors exercised their 
political influence on policy outcomes. In 2001, the election of a Liberal 
government established a new policymaking authority. These new policymakers 
were subsequently influenced by a new set of policy actors. 
59
 William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad. Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A 
Structural Approach (Missisauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd.,1990), 338. 
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The case study presents two static policy circumstances, one in 1995 (Bill 
M222) and the other in 2003 (Bill 14). When almost identical political intentions 
(Bills M222 and 14) act as a dependent variables we can investigate independent 
variables for an explanation for any policy changes. The reasons or factors that 
explain policy change have an academic and applied value. In Bill 14, the change 
to less autonomous local governments from more autonomy is an important 
political matter. In general, the policy communities and networks approach not 
only explains the descriptive aspect of the policy process but also its causal 
aspects, notably with policy outcomes and policy change. Empirical evidence 
from a study of policy changes within numerous policy sectors in Canada 
presented by Michael Howlett supports this approach by concluding that the 
"[subsystem structure was correlated with specific types of policy change."60 
Howlett goes on to explain that "[c]hange is seen as involving periods of stability 
and incremental adaptations interspersed by periods of revolutionary upheaval, 
resulting in what has often been referred to as a 'punctuated equilibrium' pattern 
of policy dynamics."61 As such, "critical junctures" or "formative moments" 
predate these punctuated equilibrium changes and help explain the process of 
policy change.62 
The criticism of these approaches is that they only explain past events and 
are not predictive. For example, Michael Atkinson and William Coleman argue 
that the policy communities and networks approach has politically descriptive 
Michael Howlett, "Linking Policy Network Structure to Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Four 
Canadian Policy Sections 1990-2000." Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol. 35 no..2 
(2003), 259. 
61
 Howlett, 242 
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 John Hogan and David Doyle, "The Importance of Ideas: An a Priori Critical Juncture 
Framework," Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol.40 no.4 (2007), 886. 
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value but little to offer in predicting outcomes. Others such as Carter Wilson 
criticize this approach for not being able to incorporate larger macro-political 
influences and the effect of the policy discourse on policy outcomes.64 Vandna 
Bhatia and William Coleman argue that ideas in the context of a policy discourse 
can be critical to whether or not policy change occurs.65 In their investigation of 
health care in Canada and Germany, they conclude that ideas do play a role in 
policy change. 
John Hogan and David Doyle have created a framework for examining 
critical junctures including a history of a crisis, and ideational change followed by 
radical policy change. This theory would not describe our case study experience 
since no radical policy change took place. However, the historical process that 
led up to the case study's policy changes, although only incremental in nature, 
can be further examined using this framework and may explain why no critical 
juncture took place. Integral to the overview of political phenomena explanation is 
policy change. It is the dynamic of political explanation but it is not meaningful 
without the contextual understanding of the political events taking place. 
Despite the criticisms of the policy communities approach, many policy 
scholars have adopted this approach in their research on public policy processes 
and outcomes. In his seminal work The Governmental Process (1959), David 
Truman presented society as individuals forming groups and lobbying for their 
Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, "Policy Networks, Policy Communities, and the 
Problems of Governance." In L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock (Eds). Policy Studies in 
Canada: The State of the Art (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 211. 
64
 Carter A. Wilson, Policy Regimes and Policy Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 248. 
65
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Canadian and German Health Systems." Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol. 36 no.4 
(2003), 716. 
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interests with government. Truman states more precisely that these groups 
determine "attitudes, values and the frame of reference" for each group and these 
police these groups' behavioral norms. These interest groups "impose[s] claims 
upon [other groups]... In order to make claims, political interest groups will seek 
access to key points of decision within these [government] institutions."67 
By the mid-1970s, Hugh Heclo's concept of "issue networks" surpassed 
earlier descriptions of interest group/ government interaction and stated that 
networks are more fluid and ever changing. Heclo focused his research on 
individuals and tracked their career changes at the micro level.68 This resulted in 
his impression that policymaking was fragmented and made up of a regularly 
changing group of players. R.A.W. Rhodes on the other hand used the term 
"network" at the level of groups and organizations, and found the policy arena to 
be less chaotic than presented by Helco.69 At this stage of development of policy 
communities and networks, the terminology starts to diverge. 
While scholars have not fully agreed on the definitions of the terminology 
used with the policy communities approach, there seems to be common 
agreement on the use of the concepts. For example, Heclo and Wildavsky define 
a policy community as a "...[sjhared framework where policy decision-making 
David Truman, "The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion." (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 501-509. 
67Truman, 505-506. 
68Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment." In Anthony King (Ed). The 
American Political System (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978). Quoted in Michael 
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Governance," In L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett and D. Laycock (Eds). Policy Studies in Canada: The 
State of the Art ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 197. 
69
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takes place. Paul Press's definition is "groupings of government agencies, 
pressure groups, media people and individuals, including academics, who, for 
various reasons, have an interest in a particular policy field and attempt to 
influence it. Most policy communities consist of two segments: the sub-
government and the attentive public."71 Other societal organizations and the 
attentive public influence public policy but do not participate in its formation.72 
R.A.W. Rhodes defines a "policy community as a network characterized by stable 
relationships, restricted membership, vertical interdependence and insulation 
from other networks and institutions."73 Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright use a 
different definition. For them, a "policy community refers to all actors or potential 
actors who share either an interest in a policy area or a common 'policy focus' 
and who over time, succeed in shaping policy. Policy network describes the 
"linking process" within a community."74 
According to William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "...[a] policy network 
refers to the properties that characterize the relationships among the particular 
set of actors that forms around an issue of importance to the policy community 
Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money (London: 
Macmillan, 1974). Quoted in Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, "Policy Networks, 
Policy Communities, and the Problems of Governance." In L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett and D. 
Laycock (Eds). Policy Studies in Canada: The State of the Art (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1996), 198. 
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Canada: The State of the Art (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 196. 
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and the community refers to the actors; the network refers to the relationship 
between the actors, particularly the sub-governments."75 
In the Canadian context Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, state: "[i]n 
parliamentary systems, bipartite structures76 have proven remarkably resistant to 
outside intrusion ,.."77 In this thesis, an integrated and pluralistic policy 
community initiated and sustained their policy agenda between Bill M222 and Bill 
14. By considering any change in this integrated policy community or the network 
(relationships between the policy actors) we may explain the policy changes 
experienced. 
Bureaucratic Theory 
Since one of the most important policy actors in this case study is the 
provincial Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services, an 
understanding of the scholarship on bureaucratic theory would be helpful in 
explaining the ministry's policy behavior. 
Bureaucratic theory suggests that bureaucracies act to maximize their 
budgets, staff complements and programs as a method of accumulating and 
75
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maintaining power. Northcote Parkinson established Parkinson's law to 
describe how government bureaucracies grew over time even though the delivery 
of their public service was shrinking. He used the example of the Royal Navy 
reducing its number of ships and sailors after World War Two while the Naval 
Ministry grew in size over the same period.79 William Niskanen, a political 
economist wrote the seminal work on bureaucratic behavior in "Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government" in 1971 and established the budget maximization 
observation in the United States' federal government.80 The Canadian scholars 
Andre Blais and Stephane Dion followed this theme in their edited work The 
Budget Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisal and Evidence in 1991.81 These 
scholars agree that the expected behavior of bureaucracies is to maximize their 
budgets over time to build and maintain their power. In this thesis' case study the 
move to reduce local government autonomy and thereby maintain the size of the 
Ministry's bureaucracy is consistent with this branch of bureaucratic theory. 
Policy Discourse and Policy Ideas 
To understand how ideas influence public policy and policy change a 
number of other concepts need explanation. A policy frame is "[c]oherent systems 
of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given field, 'world views', 
mechanisms of identity formation, principles of actions, as well as methodological 
prescriptions and practices for actors subscribing to the same frame."82 These 
78
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policy frames act to limit policy ideas because the actors within the frame have a 
similar worldview that tends to narrow their perception of both the policy problem 
and the possibilities for solution. Bhatia and Coleman have noted that "[p]olicy 
frames also enable action by redefining or reshaping definitions of problems and 
generating new strategies for action."83 
Policy frames change either incrementally or much more rapidly by 
presenting new ideas to policy actors and the policy communities to which they 
belong. These actors develop "new interests and preferences" through a policy 
discourse. According to Vandna Bhatia and William Coleman, the type of 
discourse may determine the manner in which change takes place. There are two 
types of discourse: augmentative that focuses on "preserving an existing 
dominant policy frame"; and "transformative discourse that seeks to persuade 
others of the merits of an alternative frame."84 Policy actors can either defend 
the existing dominant policy frame or make incremental changes to the frame. 
Other actors may engage in a transformative discourse by including more policy 
actors in order to convince them of the merit of their alternative frame. 
In their case study examination of the attempted privatization of the 
German and Canadian health systems, Bhatia and Coleman conclude that the 
interests and institutions remained constant during a substantial policy change in 
Germany while only incremental policy change took place in Canada.85 They 
suggest that ideas within the two policy discourses had more than a secondary 
role in the process of policy change. The use of policy discourse theory in 
explaining the causal impact of ideas on policy outcomes has some value in 
Bhatia and Coleman, 716-7. 
Bhatia and Coleman, 718. 
Bhatia and Coleman, 715-739. 
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policy analysis. In Bhatia and Coleman's case study, the authors postulate that 
the more pluralist the policy process, particularly in health policy, the less 
likelihood of substantial policy changes. In contrast, the more integrated the 
policy network appears, the more likely substantial change can take place.86 
Some scholars criticize policy discourse theory because they believe ideas play 
only a small role in policy change. This thesis presents the concept of policy 
discourse theory as one of the many analytical tools used to test variables in 
order to determine the possible causes for policy change in our case study. 
Political process and decision-making approaches are similar to the policy 
community and networks approach in that they both focus on the policy actors, 
interest groups, political policy decision makers and policy agendas. The political 
process approach explains policy change as "[alterations in the power 
arrangements: the dissolution of old political coalitions and the formation of new 
ones, the decline of established interest groups and the emergence of new 
ones."87 Wilson states that policy initiators and policy entrepreneurs define the 
problem and lead their preferred solution through the policy process to 
conclusion.88 Kingdon, seeing the process somewhat differently, states: 
"...[p]olicy change arising from the combination of right timing and skilful 
manipulation as policy entrepreneurs match policy solutions to policy problems, 
exploit opportunities, and promote change."89 Baumgartner and Jones 
"...[originated the term punctuated equilibrium to describe public policy-making 
process as characterized by long periods of stability interrupted by spurts of 
86
 Bhatia and Coleman, 715-739. 
87
 Wilson, 248. 
88
 Wilson, 248. 
89John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 1984). Quoted in 
Carter A. Wilson, Policy Regimes and Policy Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 248. 
30 
change." They use the idea of dynamic policy monopolies forming and 
dissipating, thereby causing a change in the public discourse because the new 
monopoly forms a new understanding of the old problem. In this terminology, the 
policy monopoly concept is similar to the concept of a policy community.90 
In a separate work, Jones goes on to consider factors that contribute to 
policy change. He states that: 
[t]hese factors include the role of new participants and new ideas invading 
the policy arena and expanding and redefining the issues; the media 
defining the public problem; the policy entrepreneurs promoting ideas and 
shepherding new policy proposals through the policy process; and the 
public shifting its attention to new dimensions of a problem and new 
solutions.91 
This definition of factors that explain policy change is similar to factors mentioned 
in the policy communities and networks approach and the policy discourse 
theory. 
Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework approach defines policy 
change, but requires studies to: "1) require a time perspective of a decade or 
more, 2) focus on policy subsystems, 3) include an intergovernmental dimension, 
and 4) conceptualize public policy in the same manner as belief systems."92 
Sabatier suggests two processes can explain policy subsystem change: 1) 
"...[subsystem attempt to translate... their belief systems into government 
Frank Baumgartner and Byran Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: 
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programs," and 2)" ...external perturbation, that is, the effects of system-wide 
events - changes in socioeconomic conditions, outputs from other subsystems, 
and changes in the system-wide governing coalition - on resources and 
constraints of subsystem actors."93 Sabatier suggests a pluralistic view of 
coalitions competing to "...[g]ain advantages through policy-oriented learning and 
increasing resources... in ways which give advantages to minority coalitions able 
to take advantage of policy learning and increased resources."94 
This thesis uses the policy communities and networks explanatory 
approach with careful attention to the dynamic and macro context of the case 
study. Many of the concepts that strengthen the policy communities and 
networks approach, such as policy discourse theory, policy ideas, policy frames, 
and policy change theory all combine to present a dense explanation of the policy 
process outlined in the second half of this thesis. 
'Sabatier, 250. 
'Sabatier, 250. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology used to answer the following 
research question: What factors explain the policy changes that took place 
between Bill M222 and Bill 14? The thesis uses the policy communities and 
networks approach to explain the political events surrounding the changes to Bill 
M222 and Bill 14. The chapter also describes the research design, the dependent 
and independent variables, and the method of gathering and analyzing the data. 
Political information studied without a coherent and structured approach is 
simply data. In a policy networks approach, investigators look for linkages 
between policy actors, their relationships, ideas, and interests that may explain 
any influence on the policymakers. Investigators can map these relationships with 
what Paul Pross calls a "constellation".95 This constellation graphically depicts the 
policy network or constellation and indicates the relative influence that policy 
actors had on the policymakers through the distance they are from each other. 
For example, in this case study, the 1995 constellation (see Figure 1) indicates 
the business community is a substantial distance from the opposition's policy 
subset. In Figure 2, which depicts the policy community for Bill 14, they are very 
close to the policymakers indicating a much greater level of influence. By drafting 
a new constellation for a different time this methodology shows the policy network 
change. Each constellation is a snapshot in time. In this manner, the thesis 
avoids the criticism that this approach does not address the dynamics of the 
policy process. 
Paul A. Pross, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons." In Michael S. Whittington and Glen 
Williams (3rd Eds). Canadian Politics in the 1990s (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1995): 301. 
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Figure 1-1995 Bill M222 Constellation of Local Government 
Opposition Policy Community 
Ted Nebbeling & Gordon 
Campbell, Leader Liberal 
Opposition & caucus chair 
Leader, Donald 
Lidstone, 
Lawyer, & other 
LG lawyers 
Individual local governments 
that had direct connections 
with the opposition Liberal 
elected officials, i.e. Whistler 
Richard Taylor, Executive 
Director, 
LGMA - Local Government Management Association, 
CAWS - Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and 
Women's Services, LG - Local Government, VBT-
Vancouver Board of Trade, UDI- Urban Development 
Institute. 
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Figure 2-2002-2003 Bill 14 Constellation of Local Government Policy 
Community 
The complete membership 
list of the Community Charter 
Business Coalition is: BC 
Agriculture Council, BC Auto 
Dealers Association, BC 
Chamber of Commerce, BC 
Construction Association, BC 
Real Estate Association, BC 
Restaurant and Foodservices 
Association, BC Road Builder 
Association, British Columbia 
Trucking Association, British 
Columbia &Yukon Hotel 
Association, Business 
Council of British Columbia, 
Canadian Association of 
Independent Businesses, 
Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers, 
Canadian Council of Grocery 
Producers, Canadian Home 
Builders Association, 
Canadian Manufactures and 
Exporters Association, 
Certified Management 
Accountants Society, Council 
of Tourism Associations of 
British Columbia, Gateway 
Council, Greater Victoria 
Chamber of Commerce, 
Independent Contractors and 
Businesses Association, 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Mining 
Association of British 
Columbia, Retail Council of 
Canada,, Retail BC, Tourism 
Victoria, Urban Development 
Institute. 
Ted Ncbbcling, Minister for CC, George Abbott Minister MA, 
Gordon Campbell Premier, Liberal Cabinet & caucus 
Peter Kenward, McCarthy 
T, lawyer, John Winter, BC 
Chamber of Commerce, 
Gerry Lambert, Consultant, 
Richard Taylor, Executive 
Director, Jim Abram, President 
CUPE - Canadian Union of Public Employees, GFOA 
- Government Finance Officers Association, LGMA -
Local Government Management Association, CAWS -
Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women's 
Services, LG - Local Government, VBT- Vancouver 
Board of Trade, UDI- Urban Development Institute, 
CC - Community Charter, MA - Municipal Affairs 
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Using documentary evidence available from government and policy 
network sources, a coherent picture of the issues, positions and interests is 
determined. Interviews were held with direct participants in the policy debate 
regarding the two bills to confirm the documented information and to add more 
information if applicable. This thesis investigates the accumulated information to 
understand the linkages, attitudes and positions of each policy actor. The thesis 
tests policy outcomes against each actor's positions or interests to determine the 
degree of influence they had on the policymakers. This is not an exacting 
process. Sometimes positions and outcomes are clear, as in the case of the 
Community Charter Business Coalition where numerous documents outline this 
organization's positions. At other times, policy actors mask their positions and 
attitudes for reasons of strategy, accountability or for political reasons. In the case 
of the provincial ministry, cloaking their attitudes on the critical local autonomy 
issue may have been necessary because of statutory restrictions on disclosure.96 
However, other members of the policy community, not bound by the same 
restrictions, can determine these attitudes and positions. Using the policy 
networks or communities approach the thesis presents a denser explanation of 
the policy process, policy events and policy outcomes. 
The thesis uses a simple cross time comparison case study evaluating 
data derived from primary source documents including statutes, government 
documents, government public consultation records, and secondary source 
documents from the policy network. Elite interviews using semi-structured 
Provincial employees are bound by the terms of their employment contracts not to disclose 
certain information. Cabinet discussions or reports are private materials protected from disclosure 
by statute. 
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interview techniques were used to gather additional information and confirm 
primary source documentary data. 
The Method 
Scientists need rigorous methods for collecting and analyzing evidence. 
This rigorous investigation is important to the information's ultimate credibility. 
The goal of systematic investigation is to use a methodology that explains not 
only the causal relationship between items under investigation but that considers 
and disregards all the alternative explanations. However, politics is not a precise 
field of study; causal relationships are complex and often difficult to explain with 
certainty. 
Researchers develop terminology to facilitate our explanation of political 
phenomena. We use the terms and concepts referred to as independent 
variables, dependent variables, and causality or correlation of variables to 
describe these phenomena. Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn define 
these variables as follows: 
Those phenomena that we think will help us explain the political 
characteristics or behavior that interest us are called independent 
variables. Independent variables are the measures of the phenomena that 
are thought to influence, affect, or cause some other phenomenon. 
Dependent variables are thought to be caused, to depend on, or to be a 
function of the independent variables.97 
Some independent variables cause particular phenomena in the 
dependent variables and others only correlate. Researchers expend substantial 
97
 Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, Political Science Research Methods, 3rd ed. 
(Washington: CQ Press, 1995), 45. 
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energy searching for the causal relationships between variables. The following 
example illustrates the concept of causality or correlation of a variable.98 Some 
people believe recent Canadian gun control legislation has led to lower crime 
rates; however, crime rates have dropped throughout North America over the last 
ten years. Proponents of gun control suggest a causal relationship between crime 
rates and gun control legislation while others believe the relationship only is 
merely a correlation. Variables that have no causal relationship to each other or 
have a third causal variable are spurious. For example, gun control correlates to 
the crime rate but the general improving of economic status of the population may 
be the confounding independent variable causing the decreasing crime rates. In 
this example, therefore, the relationship between gun control and crime rates is 
spurious. 
Research Design 
Political scientists research political events in an attempt to explain how 
and why they took place. "How" is related to the explanatory aspect of research 
with "why" suggesting a causality of some independent variable. The research 
design of this study is non-experimental and explanatory using the data collected 
from document analysis and elite interviews. According to Robert K. Yin, an 
effective case study design must incorporate the research question(s), the study's 
hypothesis, test the data collected against the hypothesis, and interpret 
Jeremy Wilson, Analyzing Politics: An Introduction to Empirical Methods (Scarborough: 
Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), 32-34. 
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findings. The author adopts Yin's case study design to satisfy these design 
components. 
This thesis compares the policy context of two pieces of legislation using a 
simple cross time comparison of two dependent variables (Bills M222 and 14). 
This case study allows for a temporal comparison of the two dependent variables 
and seeks to explain the factors or independent variables that lead to the 
observed changes between the two bills. A number of independent variables may 
be causal to the dependent variables but like all political events, many influences 
and relationships between the independent and dependent variables could be 
spurious or causal. To explain the causality of one independent variable it is best 
to hold all other variables constant (ceteris paribus) so that the effect of the 
independent variable is clear. Since most political science research is non-
experimental, we look for natural circumstances where variables are constant or 
controlled.100 In this thesis, the dependent variables examined were naturally 
controlled. The legislation under examination had the same stated intention, the 
same name, and was proposed by the same political party. Moreover, in both 
cases, the policy community included the same elected officials. These 
similarities allow us to investigate the impact of a number of independent 
variables using the hypothesis stated earlier. To determine the factors that 
explain the changes in the two bills we posed questions such as: What impact 
does moving from political opposition to the government in power have on policy 
change? What changes took place in the policy network or community that may 
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage 
Publications, 1994). Quoted in William Kennedy, Master's thesis, University of Northern British 
Columbia, Prince George, British Columbia, 2003, 56-57. 
100
 Wilson, Analyzing Politics, 17-69. 
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explain the observed policy change in Bill 14? Moreover, are we able to 
generalize about the policy change resulting from this research? 
Data Collection 
The thesis collected data from three kinds of sources: primary sources, 
including government documentation, secondary documentation from members 
of the policy network and semi-structured interviews. The government 
documentation includes the statutes (Bill M222 and Bill 14) and the public input 
documentation for Bill 14. Bill M222 is a more problematic source because as a 
private member's bill proposed in 1995 it did not attract the same quantity of 
related documentation. To make up for this dearth of documentation, the author 
conducted semi-structured interviews with elite policy actors, including key 
politicians, ministry officials and associational actors, to investigate or confirm the 
policy input from members of the policy community in 1995. Some secondary 
documentation was available from the policy network active in 1995. Interviews 
were also conducted with representative policy actors from the present policy 
network. These actors were chosen because of their familiarity with the public 
and private debate on the two bills and their influence on the decision-making 
process. Interviews attempted to uncover undocumented material regarding the 
extent of the policy community's influence on the process of policy change. They 
also confirm the validity of the data from our document analysis. The thesis then 
analyzes the interview data and compares the input to the document analysis. 
The thesis tests the corroborated data to determine if the hypothesis is sound. 
The explanation of the case study uses data synthesized from the research. 
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Why use the Case Study Method? 
According to Yin, case studies may be criticized for a number of reasons. It 
can be argued that case studies exhibit a "lack of rigor," and possible bias in the 
collection and use of evidence. Yin acknowledges that some case studies are not 
investigated for evidence bias with the same rigor as other research strategies. 
However, the trade off for possible evidence bias is that research may not take 
place on contemporary political phenomena if bias is too large of a concern.101 
The second criticism is that one case study cannot produce generalizations. Yin, 
however, disagrees and states: "Case studies, like experiments, are 
generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In 
this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a 'sample,' 
and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)."102 
Academics also use case studies to test theory conformity rather than generalize 
from case study evidence. The final criticism is that case studies are not readable 
because of their length and detail. This variable is controllable by the researcher. 
In some political research, it is necessary to describe political events with 
substantial detail to capture the political nuances of human behavior. Detailed 
descriptions of political phenomena can require lengthy case study reporting 
because of the complexity of the cases and issues at hand. 
This thesis lends itself to case study methodology because the political 
events are not quantitative in nature. The purpose of this investigation is to 
develop explanations for the legislative changes that took place during the period 
101Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage 
Publications, 1994).Quoted in Johnson and Joslyn, 147 
102Yin. Quoted in Johnson and Joslyn, 147. 
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under examination. The important policy information embedded in these political 
events would otherwise be difficult if not impossible to understand using other 
research strategies. Case studies are becoming the preeminent methodology for 
the study of public policy. Using a case study approach is therefore the most 
appropriate approach for this thesis especially when using the policy communities 
approach. 
Ethical Considerations 
To gather evidence from elite interviewees to confirm document research 
an interview plan is required. The author completed an application under the 
University's ethical research regulations. The purpose of this process is to assure 
research takes place in an ethical and appropriate manner. All research involving 
human subjects must undergo this process of evaluation and approval. The 
author presented an interview plan and application to the review board and was 
granted approval for the study. 
This chapter presented the thesis research design, method of data 
collection and data analysis, the process for using human subjects for research, 
and a discussion on case study methodology as the preferred research design. 
Using the research tools presented, the descriptive approach for framing the 
policy change outlined in the case study, the thesis will now present the evidence 
and subsequent analysis of the political events embodied in Bills M222 and 14. 
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Chapter Four: The Story of Two Bills 
A number of political events took place that influenced municipal legislation 
in British Columbia from the years 1991 to 2004. This chapter is divided into 6 
sections to present these political events in a chronological order. Section 1 
focuses on the general political context during these years of study. Section 2 
explains the UBCM's 1991 agenda for municipal legislative reform. The NDP 
government's response to this reform agenda including their "Protocol of 
Recognition" is examined in section 3. Section 4 outlines the 1995 Liberal 
opposition's reaction to the protocol with Bill M222 the first "Community Charter". 
Section 5 presents the re-elected NDP government's reaction (1996-2001) to on-
going local government pressure for legislative reform. This section also includes 
a discussion of the NDP's "Municipal Act Reform (MAR)" process. The final 
section presents the new Liberal government's Bill 14 process which resulted in 
the adoption of the Community Charter in 2004. See table 1 for a chronology of 
events. 
Political Context 1991-2004. 
The citizens of British Columbia elected an NDP government in 1991. This 
government replaced the Social Credit government that had been in power since 
1975. In the early 1990s a new political party emerged from the disintegration of 
the Social Credit Party. After electing Gordon Campbell as their new leader in 
1993, the Liberal Party of British Columbia (Liberals) was poised to win the 1996 
provincial election. Although the Liberals won the largest percentage of the 
popular vote they did not win a majority of electoral seats required to form a 
government. Therefore, the NDP remained in government until 2001 when they 
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were substantially defeated by the Liberals. The Liberals formed the government 
in May of 2001 based arguably on the party's "New Era Document" that became 
central to the election campaign.103 The New Era platform included a promise of 
more local government autonomy. 
Local government autonomy became an election issue in both the 1996 
and 2001 elections, with the Liberals offering more local autonomy in both 
election campaigns. In 1995, when the Liberals were in opposition, they proposed 
the private member's Bill M222. This bill offered local governments home rule 
autonomy. In 2001 after winning the election, the Liberals developed a new 
pluralistic process to "update" Bill M222. The updated bill became Bill 14 and was 
passed in 2003. It took effect on January 1, 2004. 
Table 1 Chronology of political events. 
1991 
UBCM 
Convention 
establishes 
reform agenda 
NDP become 
government 
1995-1996 
BC Liberals 
opposition 
introduces Bill 
M222 called 
"Community 
Charter" 
NDP sign the 
protocol of 
recognition of local 
government with 
UBCM 
1996 
BC Liberals lose 
the election 
NDP win a 
second term 
and continue 
MAR 1998-2000 
resulting in LGA 
2001 
BC Liberals win 
the provincial 
election and 
promise new 
"Community 
Charter" 
NDP lose the 
provincial election 
2004 
BC Liberal pass 
Bill 14 2004 as 
the new 
Community 
Charter. 
New Era Document, (accessed 9/14/08) at :www.deceivebc.ca/articles/new_era.pdf.. 
44 
UBCM's "Reform Agenda" 1991 
In 1991, the UBCM's annual convention adopted a policy paper entitled 
"Local Government and the Constitutions."^04 This policy would provide the basis 
for a decade of provincial, national and local government discussions regarding 
the appropriate level of local government autonomy in British Columbia. At the 
beginning of the discussion the UBCM proposed federal and provincial 
constitutional amendments to grant local governments independent constitutional 
authority. After the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord by national referendum, 
however, the UBCM focused its attention on provincial legislative possibilities as 
a means of satisfying the 1991 agenda. Over the years 1991-2004, two different 
provincial governments have attempted to deal with these desires for local 
government autonomy. The opposition Liberals also engaged in this autonomy 
debate in 1995 prior to the 1996 election with the presentation to the legislature 
of a private member's Bill M222, the "Community Charter". Although the NDP 
government did not react legislatively until 1996, the years leading up to 1996 
involved substantial local government-provincial government interaction regarding 
the UBCM's 1991 reform agenda. 
The NDP government's reaction (1991-1995): "Protocol of Recognition" 
Prior to the election of the NDP in October 1991, the UBCM promoted 
local government's legislative reform as part of their 1991 convention's reform 
proposal. Eventually, the existing Municipal Act was amended to reflect many of 
the concerns of the UBCM's reform agenda. 
104
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 202-3. 
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The first half of the 1990s, however, were tumultuous times in the 
relationship between local governments and the provincial government in British 
Columbia. Starting in 1992, Glen Clark, then Minister of Finance, focused on 
balancing the provincial budget by a number of policy initiatives designed to 
curtail provincial grants to local governments. These included: changing 
assessment rules for railway taxation (thereby substantially reducing municipal 
industrial taxation); and downloading other provincial financial responsibilities 
such as arterial highways and certain bridge maintenance costs to local 
governments.105 Clark had implemented these new financial policies with little or 
no consultation with local governments. 
Local governments were powerless to respond meaningfully since they are 
creatures of the provincial legislature. The UBCM did respond politically by 
holding a Financial Summit in January 1993 in an attempt to change the 
government's approach. Although this initiative was successful for 1993, 
subsequent years included additional grant reductions and downloaded service 
responsibilities.106 This serious loss of provincial revenues and the non-pluralistic 
manner of provincial policy implementation disturbed many local governments 
and fuelled the debate over structural reform to local government legislation to 
allow more local autonomy.107 
The NDP government eventually entered into discussions with the UBCM 
to establish a protocol of recognition between local governments and the 
provincial government, in the hope that this would reduce the tension between 
the parties. The Province of British Columbia and the UBCM eventually agreed to 
this protocol and formally recognized local government as an order of 
105
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 210-216. 
106
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 210. 
107
 Interview #3. 
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government in 1996. This marked the first step toward the NDP government's 
Municipal Act Reform (MAR). Prior to the 1996 provincial election, some of 
the1996 UBCM convention delegates expressed their displeasure with Premier 
Glen Clark confirming that tension between the parties still existed.108 The 
Protocol of Recognition established a provincial/ UBCM Joint Council to work out 
conflicts and allow for consultation on provincial policy initiatives.109 Nevertheless, 
the enforcement of the protocol and the new provincial/local government 
relationship codified in Bill 31's recognition of local government as an Order of 
Government was by means of moral and political suasion. The protocol contained 
no effective transfer of statutory power or constitutional status.110 The province 
implemented more local government revenue reductions and downloaded new 
responsibilities without consultation, confirming to local governments that the 
protocol meant little to the government. This caused the UBCM to suspend their 
involvement in the Joint Council in 1998.111 These actions led to increased 
distrust of the provincial government. During the pivotal 1995-6 period, the Liberal 
opposition was concerned about the discussion between the UBCM and the 
provincial government regarding the "Protocol of Recognition" and presented 
private member's Bill M222 "Community Charter" to the legislature. 
Liberal Opposition's reaction: Bill M222-"Home Rule" 
In 1995, prior to the anticipated 1996 provincial election, the Liberal 
opposition tabled private member's Bill M222. A Liberal insider the suggested 
one of the reasons for the development and hasty presentation of Bill M222 
108
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 214. 
109
 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 210. 
110
 Buholzer, 12-4. 
111
 Buholzer, 215-6. 
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directly related to the NDP's discussion with the UBCM on the Protocol of 
Recognition.^2 Although the policy actors and entrepreneurs in the Liberal Party 
had a long association with the issue of local government autonomy, the timing of 
the presentation of this bill may have had other partisan motivations.113 The 
Liberals called the bill the "Community Charter" to reflect the optics, if not the 
reality, of local autonomy, and the positive history of the Vancouver Charter.114 
The leader of the opposition and ex-Mayor of Vancouver, Gordon Campbell, 
touted this bill as providing new autonomy for local governments. In fact, this 
proposed legislation did outline additional local powers. Section 35 of the Bill 
provided local governments with powers in relationship to any matter "not 
expressly excluded from its competence by an enactment or limited by this 
Charter, within the legislative competence of the Province, and not inconsistent 
with an enactment of the Province or Canada."115 In theory, the proposal would 
have finally granted "home rule" to British Columbia's municipalities. Other 
principles of Bill M222 that expanded the range of local government autonomy 
included: 
1. Recognition of communities as an order of government;116 
2. Guarantee communities the rights set out in the statute, subject only to 
the prescribed limits in the act; 
3. The powers of communities must be adequate to meet local needs; 
"^Interview #2. 
113
 Gordon Campbell, the Leader of the Opposition, had advocated for local government 
autonomy as the Vice President of the UBCM. 
114
 Buholzer, 2-5. 
115
 Buholzer, 3. 
116
 Legally, the only effective method of recognizing local government as an order of government 
is through an amendment to the Canadian constitution. However, provincial legislatures can enact 
provincial legislation that mimics the effects of a constitutional amendment. 
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4. The ultimate determination of the local public interest lies exclusively 
with the local elected officials, including the right to determine the level 
of local expenditures and taxation; 
5. Communities have a legitimate expectation that legislation empowering 
communities will not be repealed or amended by the Legislative 
Assembly of the Province except by extraordinary legal processes and 
procedures and the Province will give written notice to, and consult 
with, communities before amending provincial legislation, regulations, 
policies, programs or orders that affect communities; 
6. The Province's legislation, regulations, policies, programs or orders 
that affect communities will respect the varying needs and conditions of 
different communities in different areas of the Province; 
7. The Province, its crown corporations and agencies will comply with 
local government authority in the areas of community jurisdiction; 
8. The Province and communities will resolve conflicts by consultation, 
negotiation, and, if necessary, arbitration; 
9. The Province will notify and consult with communities when addressing 
inter-provincial, national or international issues or agreements that will 
impact the jurisdiction of communities; 
10. The Province will consult with communities and share decision-making 
with communities where the Province and the communities wish to act 
or exercise power in relation to any matter that is within the jurisdiction 
of the Province of the communities; 
11. The right of communities to exercise policy discretion within their 
jurisdiction includes the right to apply revenue transfers from the 
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Province for any purpose despite conditions the Province may attach to 
the revenue transfer; 
12. No community is obligated to accept a transfer of new powers or duties 
from the Province unless the community consents to the transfer on the 
basis of an allocation of new financial or other resources required by 
the community to exercise the new power or fulfill the new duty; 
13. Communities must have financial and other resources that are 
sufficient to support local needs and that are distinct from the financial 
and other resources of other orders of government; 
14. The purpose of the act (M222) is to provide local governments with the 
powers to exercise their initiative with respect to any matter, which is 
not excluded from their competence or assigned, to another 
authority.117 
This set of principles and purposes clearly set out an agenda for further 
autonomy for local governments or, as the act refers to them, "communities." 
Some of these principles were subsequently part of the NDP's MAR 
process. For example, in 1995, the NDP government discussed the recognition of 
local government as an order of government. This discussion evolved into the 
Protocol of Recognition (an agreement between the Province of British Columbia 
and the UBCM) and in 1998, Bill 31 adopted the order of government definition 
for local governments under the bill's preamble. 
Principles 2, 3, 4, and 5 (suggestions of legislative certainty and 
recognition of local governments' needs and authority) were new concepts, which 
117
 Bill M222-1995, (accessed 09/08/08). 
50 
attempted to place legislative certainty in the Community Charter for local 
governments. At this stage of the Charter's evolution, the right of consultation 
with the Provincial Government was with the individual local government and was 
not conducted through the UBCM. 
Principle 6, "to respect the varying needs...of communities," is an attempt 
to distribute the impacts of central policy initiatives differently to different 
communities.118 Principle 6 does nothing for local government autonomy but 
does satisfy a geographic property tax inequity in the Province of British 
Columbia. For example, services such as solid waste management are 
provincially mandated; however, some regions of the province (particularly in the 
north) do not have the economies of scale necessary to deliver this service with a 
similar cost structure to those regions with higher population densities. Therefore, 
the local government tax rates for solid waste management service are different 
for different regions of the province.119 
Principle 7 (the need for the Province of British Columbia to abide by local 
government bylaws) is another perennial complaint of local governments and 
would have restricted the province from using their ultra varies power to ignore 
local government regulations, taxes and user fees. This principle does not 
increase local government autonomy, but rather it reduces the province's 
autonomy. 
Principles 8, 9 and 10 would have granted local governments a right of 
consultation. This right is not presently in the existing Municipal Act or 
subsequently the Local Government Act. A consultation right for local 
118
 Buholzer, 14. 
119
 Cariboo Regional District property taxation for solid waste management was $441,067 for 
2007 while Comox Valley Regional District was 0 for 2007. See Cariboo Regional District 5 year 
Financial Plan and Comox Valley Regional District 5 Year Financial Plan. 
51 
government would allow for warning of impending provincial policy change and 
permit local governments to enhance the representation of their local interests. 
The negotiations and joint decision-making referred to in principle 8 and 10 
were unprecedented in the provincial/local government relationship. This principle 
experimented with joint governance between the province and local governments. 
Arbitration of local government/provincial disputes in principle 8 was also new. 
Both these principles challenge the idea that the legislature is the final arbitrator 
on all matters within provincial jurisdiction. 
Principle 11 suggests local governments could act in bad faith by 
accepting a provincial grant for one purpose and reallocating the funds for 
another purpose. Given that authors of this principle could one day be 
government, this principle could cause considerable conflict between local 
governments and the province. Professional auditors and municipal chief financial 
officers would not support such actions. The underlying principle of unconditional 
granting to local governments is likely what principle 11 intended. 
Principle 12 is simply a prohibition against provincial downloading. This 
restricts the province's autonomy and protects local governments against 
provincial bullying by requiring either the accompanying resources for provincially 
delegated services or the need to amend provincial legislation before the 
province could download services to local governments. 
Principles 13, 14 and section 35 of the Community Charter (Bill M 222) all 
acknowledge the need for new and creative revenue streams for local 
governments. These principles approve additional autonomy for local 
governments. Local governments could now act creatively to solve their local 
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service delivery challenges. Taken together, Section 35 of Bill M222 effectively 
granted home rule to local governments. 
Bill M222 was developed by a small but knowledgeable group of local 
government policy actors that included opposition Members of the Legislative 
Assembly ( MLA's), a few municipal lawyers and local government appointed 
officials. The local government opposition critic, Ted Nebbeling, led this group. 
Prior to being an MLA, Nebbeling had been the Mayor of the Resort Municipality 
of Whistler. He was well acquainted with the local government policy network and 
had numerous contacts within the legal and administrative segments of this 
group. These contacts helped Nebbeling draft Bill M222.120 Gordon Campbell, 
leader of the Liberal opposition, also supported Bill M222.121 As a former Mayor 
of the City of Vancouver and former President of UBCM, Gordon Campbell was a 
long time member of the local government policy network. 
Although the government had tried to smooth its relations with local 
governments through the UBCM protocol, at the time there was still considerable 
displeasure with the actions of the government. This prompted a few local 
government practitioners to assist the opposition in the drafting of a new 
municipal statute focusing on reducing provincial oversight over local 
governments. Although the local government policy community at the time was 
quite large, this small group of policy entrepreneurs met in secret to prevent the 
government from co-opting their proposal. As such, the resources necessary to 
develop a comprehensive and detailed bill were not available to this small group 
of policy entrepreneurs.122 
120
 Due to the sensitive and partisan nature of British Columbia politics, it is not appropriate to 
name the individuals involved in the drafting of Bill M222. 
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The development of Bill M222 served numerous purposes for the 
opposition Liberal party. The bill co-opted the government's local government 
political agenda by presenting a more autonomous piece of legislation at the 
same time the NDP government was improving its local government relationships 
through the Protocol of Recognition. The bill's presentation capitalized on the 
growing dissatisfaction by local governments towards the NDP government. It 
also satisfied the desires of local governments for greater autonomy where many 
of the 1996 Liberal provincial election candidates and supporters resided. 
Bill M222 proposed to loosen provincial control over local governments 
through the delegation of home rule. This action is prima facie against the 
provincial interest because home rule reduces the direct authority of the province 
over local governments. Conventional wisdom suggests that when political 
parties are in opposition they are more likely to propose the delegation of power 
than when they are in government and can exercise that power. No direct 
evidence was available to determine the complete intentions of the Liberal 
opposition in the presentation of Bill M222. Bill M222 did, however, offer the 
prospect of home rule for local governments, long held as the highest prize short 
of constitutional recognition.123 
Many local government officials supported Bill M222 recognizing that 
additional legislative autonomy could grant some protection from partisan 
provincial actions that satisfied provincial political interests at the expense of local 
governments.124 Bill M222's latent flaw was its very non-pluralistic development. 
This is not the hallmark of sustainable legislation. The policy network approach 
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suggests that as networks move away from tight integration of the actors to a 
more open pluralistic environment more influences will come to bear on the 
policymakers resulting in different outcomes than expected. In the next iteration 
of the "Community Charter" after the 2001 election, this flaw proved fatal for the 
home rule aspect of the bill. Other principles were also discarded due in large 
part to the efforts of the provincial ministry, the broader public and associational 
groups. 
The NDP won their second term in the 1996 provincial election. They then 
developed an agenda for making incremental changes to the Municipal Act, 
starting in 1998 and continuing until their electoral defeat in 2001. This was called 
the Municipal Act Reform (MAR) process. The government's MAR process 
continued throughout their second term of office. This policy process finally 
resulted in the new Local Government Act in 2000. 
NDP government's "MAR" post 1996 re-election. 
With continuing UBCM pressure the re-elected NDP government enacted 
the "Protocol of Recognition" in 1996 and established a "Municipal Act Reform" 
(MAR) process. By the end of the decade (1998- 2000), three bills designed to 
modernize the Municipal Act were presented to the provincial legislature in 
response to the UBCM's reform agenda. In a three-year program of Municipal Act 
reform the government addressed many of the matters presented by the 1991 
UBCM agenda for reform. 
Municipal Act Reform was a slow and deliberate public policy process 
involving many of the local government's institutional voices. The government's 
need to reduce the political friction between themselves and local governments 
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likely prompted the MAR process. The provincial government's Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs coordinated the interests of other ministries such as the Ministry 
of Transportation, Finance and Attorney General and consulted local 
governments through UBCM working groups and conferences. They also 
presented for local government consideration numerous provincial policy 
options.125 
This process was pluralistic and involved most local government policy 
actors engaged at the time. These included all municipal and regional local 
governments, the municipal law association, consultants and municipal 
associational groups. Interestingly, business groups did not present papers on 
any changes to the act and appeared to be disengaged with the process. The 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs managed the MAR process that represented 
institutionally driven incremental policy change. Legal experts, however, 
suggested no legally satisfying changes took place in MAR that would give 
additional autonomy to local governments.126 
The UBCM made the argument to the provincial government that local 
governments needed legislative empowerment in order to manage their own 
financial affairs. In 1997, the government appointed Mike Famsworth as Minister 
of Municipal Affairs and in a show of good faith and relationship-building enacted 
Bill 47 "Protocol of Recognition Sub-agreement on a New Legislative Foundation 
for Local Government."^27 This sub-agreement was the blueprint for the MAR 
process. The first step in MAR was the development of Bill 31 in 1998. 
No direct evidence is available to determine if part of the province's 
motivation for this policy initiative was the tabling of the Liberal's Bill M222 in 
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1995. The 1996 Protocol of Recognition between the UBCM and the provincial 
government represented a prelude to the changes to the existing Municipal Act. 
The preamble or recognition sections of Bill 31 have no force or effect because it 
is not possible to alter local government's constitutional status through provincial 
legislation. To establish local government as an order of government, as Bill 31 
suggests, requires an amendment to the Canadian Constitution. The wording of 
the protocol and the new recognition sections of Bill 31 are virtually identical, but 
the act accomplished little transfer of power since the preamble in Bill 31 was 
legally ineffective.128 The establishment of a preamble does not grant exercisable 
power to local governments. 
Bill 31 was the first of three NDP reform bills. Bill 31's provincial publicity 
material stated "... [Bill 31] recognizes local government as an independent, 
responsible and accountable order of government. That bill makes other 
significant changes, including establishing principles for relations between the 
provincial and local governments under the Municipal Act; empowering local 
governments with broad corporate powers; and providing greater flexibility for 
public private partnerships."129 The Local Government Statutes Amendment Act, 
1999 (Bill 88) introduced broad service powers, provisions for council meeting 
transparency and a requirement for financial consolidation in municipal financial 
statements. This was followed by the Local Government Statutes Amendment 
Act, 2000 (Bill 14) that transformed the Municipal Act into the Local Government 
Act.no According to the Ministry's website, the purpose of The Local Government 
Statutes Amendment Act,2000, Bill 14's is to "[include] a number of 
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housekeeping amendments intended to clarify legislative policy, eliminate 
provisions that are no longer needed, and to facilitate improved local government 
processes."131 The Ministry of Municipal Affairs managed this reform process 
using their small staff of policy analysts with the legislative drafting expertise 
provided by the Ministry of the Attorney General's staff. 
Although many issues of contention between the provincial and local 
governments had been discussed in the MAR process, there was no effective 
transfer of authority or autonomy. MAR was at best incremental policy change 
similar to the many years of legislative changes that preceded it. With the election 
of the new Liberal government in 2001, local government autonomy was again a 
subject of substantial political interest. 
Bill 14 "Community Charter" 
In 2001, the Liberals elected almost a complete majority to the 
legislature.132 One of the promises made in the "New Era Document" was the 
establishment of the Community Charter within 90 days of becoming the 
government.133 In 1995, while in opposition, the Liberals had tabled a private 
member's in the legislature called the "Community Charter"(Bill 14). Starting with 
the existing Liberal private member's bill of 1995, Bill M222, the government 
developed a new process to establish a "Community Charter."134 No evidence 
was available to explain why Bill M222 was not tabled within 90 days of the 
Liberals taking office (as promised in the New Era Document) and a new process 
131
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was developed instead. It is notable, however, that the Ministry of Community, 
Aboriginal and Women's Affairs became the new entrant to Liberal government's 
policy subgroup at this time. 
Although the NDP government had modernized the Municipal Act during 
the late 1990's, the opposition Liberals still presented the concept of a new 
"Community Charter" as central to their 2001 election campaign.135 The 
"Community Charter" later became Bill 14 replicating, at least in name, the earlier 
private member's Bill M222. This new charter was heralded by the new provincial 
government as a grant of greater autonomy to local governments in British 
Columbia. Although the new government had promised a Community Charter bill 
within 90 days of taking office, it first enacted the Community Charter Council Act 
which created a council to oversee the development and implementation of the 
new legislation.136 
The Council consisted of four UBCM appointed members, four provincial 
appointees on the UBCM's recommendation, and three members appointed by 
Cabinet and the Minister Responsible for the Community Charter, Ted Nebbeling. 
The members were Hans Cunningham, Patricia Wallace, Frank Leonard and Jim 
Abram representing the UCBM; Don Avison, Ben Marr, Keith Saddlemayer 
representing the province; and Helen Sparkes, Joyce Harder, Gerry Furney and 
Marilyn Baker as the joint appointees of the Cabinet and the Minister.137 
"
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The Council's mandate was to develop a "Community Charter" for 
Cabinet's consideration. All the members of the Council had either direct 
experience as elected or appointed officials of local governments, or had a long-
standing involvement with local governments. As with MAR, the provincial 
ministry of responsible for local governments again managed the process of 
legislative development.138 The Ministry and UBCM staff acted as a joint 
secretariat to the Charter Council and managed the public input and the 
consultative process after the draft charter was tabled. This involved a small staff 
at the Ministry including its Assistant Deputy Minister and senior policy analysts. 
The UBCM's staff included its executive director. 
During the Community Charter discussions regarding issues of 
decentralization of power the Ministry staff were reluctant to support the Council's 
desire for greater autonomy. This was confirmed by numerous interviewees on 
the Charter Council. One concern of the Ministry was the alleged immaturity of 
the policy analysis and policy development capacity of local governments. The 
Ministry confirmed those considerations at seminars presented by the Ministry 
after the Charter came into force. The seminars focused on teaching local 
governments the process of policy development.139 
In March of 2002, the Charter Council produced a draft Community 
Charter for Cabinet and subsequently released it for public comment in May of 
2002. Due to Cabinet secrecy no evidence was available to determine if changes 
were made to the Charter between March and May 2002.The changes in the new 
draft Community Charter (May 2002) did not significantly alter the changes 
138
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already made by the earlier NDP amendments to the Municipal Act, now referred 
to as the Local Government Act.uo The provincial government left numerous 
important issues for future processes; for example, new revenue sources and the 
authority to develop them, and regional district reform. As recently as 2005, 
however, Minister of Community Affairs, Ida Chong, indicated that she was not 
contemplating a new reform process.141 
The public release of the draft Community Charter encouraged other 
members of the local government policy network to engage the government. 
Numerous associational groups offered comments to the government. For 
example, the Local Government Management Association (LGMA), the 
Government Finance Officers of British Columbia and the Building Officials 
Association of British Columbia submitted written comments and 
recommendations.142 The West Coast Environmental Law Society produced a 
paper entitled "Creating Livable Communities: A Submission to the Minister of 
Community, Aboriginal and Women's Affairs on Phase 1 of The Draft Community 
Charter, November 2002."143 These associational groups were generally 
supportive of the draft and made numerous technical comments but gave little 
policy advice. Others, such as the newly formed Community Charter Business 
Coalition, were concerned about the possibility of more autonomy for local 
government. The Coalition included 26 business groups, councils and 
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associations. Some of the members included: the British Columbia Chambers of 
Commerce, Business Council of British Columbia, British Columbia Real Estate 
Association, Canadian Home Builder Association, British Columbia Construction 
Association, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of British Columbia and the 
Urban Development Institute.144 
The Charter Council worked closely with the UBCM, the newly named 
Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services, and local governments 
to improve the 2002 draft Community Charter. The Ministry held consultation 
meetings throughout British Columbia culminating in a two-day conference in 
Vancouver in June 2002. The Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Ministry of 
Attorney General prepared the draft bill.145 Some of the Charter Council members 
complained that officials in the provincial Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and 
Women's Services and the Ministry of Attorney General's legislative draftsperson 
resisted many of their initiatives and perspectives.146 This is evidenced by the list 
of issues left unresolved because of a lack of consensus. These issues included: 
new municipal revenues, municipal liability limits for borrowing, exempting 
industry from taxation to attract business, and the role of the Charter Council after 
The complete membership list of the Community Charter Business Coalition is: British 
Columbia Agriculture Council, British Columbia Auto Dealers Association, British Columbia 
Chamber of Commerce, British Columbia Construction Association, British Columbia Real Estate 
Association, British Columbia Restaurant and Foodservices Association, British Columbia Road 
Builder Association, British Columbia Trucking Association, British Columbia &Yukon Hotel 
Association, Business Council of British Columbia, Canadian Association of Independent 
Businesses, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Canadian Council of Grocery 
Producers, Canadian Home Builders Association, Canadian Manufactures and Exporters 
Association, Certified Management Accountants Society, Council of Tourism Associations of 
British Columbia, Gateway Council, Greater Victoria Chamber of Commerce, Independent 
Contractors and Businesses Association, Institute of Chartered Accountants, Mining Association 
of British Columbia, Retail Council of Canada,, Retail British Columbia, Tourism Victoria, Urban 
Development Institute. 
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the Charter's adoption.147 As William Buholzer states in his comprehensive legal 
history and interpretation of the Community Charter: "The proposed legislation 
(draft Community Charter) was not a further refinement of Bill M222, but an 
entirely new proposal, blending a few key elements of that initiative with the 
recently [2000] amended Local Government Act"U8 
The draft Community Charter also attracted new entrants into the local 
government policy network. Important examples are the inclusion of the 
Community Charter Business Coalition, Urban Development Institute, the 
Vancouver Board of Trade and the British Columbia Chambers of Commerce. 
These are all organized groups that represent business interests associated with 
residential, commercial and industrial urban development. These groups were not 
active in the local government policy community under the NDP government, but 
became active before and after the Community Charter draft bill was proposed.149 
The process of presenting a draft Charter encouraged new policy actors to 
engage the government regarding their interests. This was similar to the NDP's 
MAR process, yet in stark opposition to the small, narrowly focused and secretive 
policy group that developed Bill M222. 
Business groups had supported the Liberal government's bid for election in 
2001, so naturally they expected more influence on the policymaking process. 
The Community Charter Business Coalition, the Vancouver Board of Trade and 
the British Columbia Construction Association, in particular, produced papers 
explaining the dangers of local government autonomy and encouraging the 
province to maintain strong central control and provincial standardization over 
Buholzer, 8. 
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local governments.150 McCarthy Tetrault LLP, a law firm specializing in municipal 
affairs published a number of Legal Updates supporting the Community Charter 
Business Coalition's concerns and articulating the Coalition's specific complaints. 
These complaints included the need to reduce local government's general 
authority and numerous specific concerns regarding business regulation and 
prohibition. Later Legal Updates codified the resulting changes made by the 
provincial government to address the Coalition's concerns.151 This is evidence of 
the influence the Coalition had on the provincial government of the day. 
According to the Coalition's documentation between May of 2002 and the spring 
of 2003, the Coalition was able to change the proposed draft Community Charter 
by discarding the following local government powers: 
1. To regulate, prohibit or impose requirements regarding anything the 
municipality considered appropriate; 
2. To impose requirements or prohibit business; regulate, prohibit or 
impose requirements on places open to the public; 
3. To cut off utilities on a site by site basis for any other reason than 
non-payment; 
4. To close highways without accommodating utilities; 
5. To charge road tolls; 
6. To require compensation for extraordinary traffic on a municipal 
road.152 
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The Coalition also argued that the use of broad municipal powers should not 
affect existing land use regulations, or allow municipalities to avoid legislative 
limits imposed by statute.153 The Community Charter Business Coalition 
requested these reductions in the Charter's powers and the provincial 
government subsequently made these changes. 
Business's specific concerns about the draft Community Charter focused 
on local government's ability to secure new taxation regimes to finance municipal 
infrastructure services. The possibility of new charges and fees or increased 
development costs was a primary concern.154 At the time, the provincial 
government approved development charges centrally, theoretically to maintain 
some equity between the existing taxpayers and the new development. Local 
government's ability to associate development costs, particularly externalities, 
with new development is an ongoing issue of financial equity. New residents pay 
for offsite service externalities through their property taxes if the development 
industry does not pay these costs at time of development. For example, if a 
municipality does not collect an appropriate share of the cost of a central sanitary 
sewage plant, servicing more than one specific development through offsite 
development charges, existing and new property tax payers have to finance 
these expenditures. Similar circumstances exist for major roadways, water 
systems and other infrastructure services. Local governments, although 
generally supportive of business interests, have been progressively moving 
towards extracting higher costs from the development industry for both on and 
offsite servicing requirements.155 These were the reasons for the Urban 
Development Institute's reluctance to support more autonomy for local 
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government. The institute believed the Charter did not have the necessary 
statutory checks and balances to limit the potential financial burden placed on the 
institute's members.156 
The Charter Council hotly debated the issue of financing local 
governments through user fees, development charges or new tax regimes.157 
However, no new revenue streams for local governments were included in the 
Community Charter. As a result, local governments still have a very narrow and 
conservative set of revenue sources. Regardless of the issues of fiscal autonomy 
raised by some members of the Community Charter Council, they failed to 
influence the policymakers sufficiently to implement the fiscal powers outlined in 
the earlier Bill M222. 
The "Community Charter" became a government Bill and passed first 
reading on March 11, 2003. After second reading on April 29, the legislature 
referred the Bill to the Committee of the Whole House for consideration on May 7. 
It was during this debate that the Minister of State for the Community Charter 
moved two minor amendments and the bill was read a third time on May 8 and 
granted Royal Assent on May 29, 2003.158 Regulation 423/2003 brought the Bill 
into force and it became effective January 1, 2004.159 The most notable 
legislative debate regarding the bill debated the legitimacy of section 1's 
recognition of local government as an order of government. The opposition 
pressed the Minister of State for the Community Charter, Ted Nebbling, to state 
the constitutional significance of Section 1. His retort was that the previous 
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government had used similar language in Section 1 of the Local Government Act 
with similar effect.160 
The provincial government developed the new Community Charter through 
a deliberate and iterative policy process involving the Community Charter 
Council, Cabinet, the UBCM, associational groups, business groups, local 
governments and numerous provincial ministries coordinated by the Ministry of 
Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services. As part of this process, the 
Ministry held regional local government meetings and proposed certain policy 
choices. For example, the Ministry questioned the participants on the advisability 
of granting businesses a tax advantage. The Ministry compiled this regional input 
and presented the findings at a later provincial plenary meeting. The wider local 
government policy community also had input. This broader process changed the 
draft Community Charter to reflect the varied needs and desires of the local 
government policy community. Not all perspectives, however, were included in 
the final bill. 
The new Charter, in Section 1, proposes the principles of municipal 
governance. The act states: 
1(1) Municipalities and their councils are recognized as an order of 
government within their jurisdiction that 
(a) is democratically elected, autonomous, responsible and accountable, 
(b) is established and continued by the will of the residents of their 
communities, and 
(c) provides for the municipal purposes of their communities. 
British Columbia Government Hansard, accessed (03/14/09) at: 
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(2) In relation to subsection (1), the Provincial government recognizes that 
municipalities require 
(a) adequate powers and discretion to address existing and future 
community needs, 
(b) authority to determine the public interest of their communities, within a 
legislative framework that supports balance and certainty in relationship 
to the differing interests of their communities, 
(c) the ability to draw on financial and other resources that are adequate to 
support community needs, 
(d) authority to determine the levels of municipal expenditures and taxation 
that are appropriate for their purposes, and 
(e) authority to provide effective management and delivery of services in a 
manner that is responsive to community needs.161 
Part 1 of Bill 14 did not grant additional authority to local governments. It 
merely acknowledges that good local governance requires these attributes. Part 1 
is similar to Bill M222, but M222 states: "The Community Charter guarantees 
communities the rights and powers set out in it, ... subject only to the limits 
prescribed in the Community Charter."162 A further example is the difference 
between 2 (d) above and the clause in Bill M222 which states that "[t]he ultimate 
determination of the public interest lies exclusively with locally elected officials, 
including the right to determine the level of local expenditures and taxation." Bill 
M222 sets out clear authority through local rights and provincial prohibitions as 
opposed to recognition through a list of positive governance attributes. 
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Section 2 of Part 1 of Bill 14 is also different from Bill M222 in approach. 
Section 2 concerns "Principles of municipal-provincial relations" and states: 
2(1) The citizens of British Columbia are best served when, in their 
relationship, municipalities and the Provincial government 
(a) acknowledge and respect the jurisdiction of each, 
(b) work towards harmonization of Provincial and municipal 
enactments, policies and programs, and 
(c) foster cooperative approaches to matters of mutual interest. 
(2) The relationship between municipalities and the Provincial 
government is based on the following principles: 
(a) the Provincial government respects municipal authority and 
municipalities respect Provincial authority; 
(b) the Provincial government must not assign responsibilities to 
municipalities unless there is provision for resources required to 
fulfill the responsibilities; 
(c) consultation is needed on matters of mutual interest, including 
consultation by the Provincial government on 
(i) proposed changes to local government legislation 
(ii) proposed changes to revenue transfers to 
municipalities, and 
(iii) proposed changes to Provincial programs that will 
have significant impact in relation to matters that are 
within municipal authority; 
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(d) the Provincial government respects the varying needs and 
conditions of different municipalities in different areas of British 
Columbia; 
(e) consideration of municipal interests is needed when the Provincial 
government participates in interprovincial, national or international 
discussions on matters that affect municipalities; 
(f) the authority of municipalities is balanced by the responsibility of the 
Provincial government to consider the interests of the citizens of 
British Columbia generally; 
(g) the Provincial government and municipalities should attempt to 
resolve conflicts between them by consultation, negotiation, 
facilitation and other forms of dispute resolution. 
The relationship section of Bill 14 sets out the province's preferences in 
their relationship with local governments. Bill M222 provided a clear set of 
obligations on the part of the province. Bill M222 used language such as "will 
notify and consult" in principle 9. In this regard, Bill 14 - The Community Charter 
provides substantially reduced autonomy for local governments when compared 
to Bill M-222. 
Both symbolically and practically Bill M222 provided for a higher degree of 
autonomy than Bill 14; Bill M222 offered home rule to British Columbia 
municipalities while Bill 14 does not. The provincial government had again 
refused to grant municipalities' home rule. Although seldom mentioned or 
debated since the legislature's last refusal in 1919, home rule remains the 
symbolic goal for additional local autonomy. Practically, Bill M222 included local 
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rights and protections against abuse of power by any provincial government. Like 
its predecessor, the Local Government Act, Bill 14 does not offer local 
governments the additional direct statutory authority that constitutes home rule. 
The act suggests vague general principles, easily misinterpreted as actual 
authority. Using the term "spheres of jurisdiction", Bill 14 codifies ten spheres of 
independent and autonomous jurisdiction and five areas of provincial-municipal 
concurrent regulatory authority. These five concurrent jurisdictions include 
wildlife, public health, building regulation standards, protection of the natural 
environment and prohibition of soil removal or deposit.163 Bill 14 offers an 
incremental increase in local government autonomy that is consistent with the 
long tradition of municipal-provincial policy change. This bill does not transform 
the basis of local government authority, as contemplated in Bill M222. 
Rhetoric and optics aside, the new Community Charter is simply another 
incremental increase in the prescriptive authority afforded to local governments. 
This grant of authority is presented in legally untested language that broadens 
the statute's authority to resist long held common law rules that interpret any local 
government authority-granting statue very narrowly.164 The following chapter 
analyses the reasons for the differences between Bill M222 and Bill 14, and 
investigates and discusses the loss of local government autonomy in Bill 14. 
Section 702 of the Local Government Act, the precursor legislation to the Community Charter, 
permitted the regulation and prohibition of common nuisance animals. Under the Community 
Charter animals or wildlife fall under the concurrent authority regime where "ad hoc ministerial 
approvals..., regulations defining the scope of exclusive municipal authority..., and provincial-
municipal agreements..." are required. 
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Chapter Five: Analysis and Discussion 
This chapter analyzes four main causal factors that explain the changes in 
autonomy between Bill M222 and Bill 14. They are: the inclusion of the Ministry of 
Community Aboriginal and Women's Services into the policy community, the role 
played by the Community Charter Business Coalition, the UBCM's ongoing 
involvement and various other macro-political events and trends. To explain the 
erosion of autonomy the thesis analyzes the local government policy communities 
in 1995-6 and again in 2002-4 for relevant factors or events that caused policy 
changes, and postulates the reasons for these changes. To place a relative 
efficacy on each factor is difficult with any degree of certainty. It is, however, 
valuable to understand the degree to which factors influenced policy changes. To 
help determine this influence, the thesis considers whether each factor or reason 
for change could have effected change independently or required other factors to 
effect change. The thesis postulates that factors that acted independently had 
more influence than those that acted in concert with other factors. 
The local government policy community acts as a closely associated 
network of provincial associations, many of which have cross membership and 
similar purposes.165 Provincial policy development for local governments reflects 
an integrated and tightly knit policy network.166 In part, this network structure 
helps explain the observed differences between Bills 14 and M222. When the 
power structure changes as a result of a provincial election the network structure 
takes on a new set of policy influences and new policy actors. The election of the 
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Liberals in 2001 expanded the original policy community to include a provincial 
advocate (government ministry) and another powerful policy actor (Community 
Charter Business Coalition). The inclusion of these new policy actors created 
resistance to the idea of greater autonomy for local governments. At the same 
time, the Liberals were accountable for their earlier private member's Bill M222 
and the promises that they made during the 2001 election campaign. The earlier 
NDP government had made numerous changes to the existing Municipal Act, 
which created difficult political circumstances for the new Liberal government. 
The NDP's Local Government Act had already made many of the incremental 
changes championed by the UBCM. The Liberal government made election 
promises for new autonomy for local governments in 2001 and now had the 
political power to deliver on those promises.167 
New Policy Actors: Ministry Officials 
The first and likely most important change to the policy network subset in 
2001 is the inclusion of officials from the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal, and 
Women's Services. The earlier opposition policy subset excluded these officials 
because they were accountable to the government of the day. Opposition parties 
do not have access to the policy analysis capacity or the policy development 
expertise of the provincial bureaucracy. The government controls those resources 
and uses them for its political advantage. 
This group had substantial influence on the new policymakers and the 
development and execution of the policy process.168 The Ministry had also 
managed the earlier NDP reform process resulting in the late 1990s Local 
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Government Act. These Ministry officials had just completed the last 
government's MAR process and were now leading a process to establish a new 
community charter. A number of Ministry officials remained the same during the 
policy development of Bill 14 and the MAR process.169 Some policy community 
scholars believe individual public officials can strongly influence policy outcomes 
through their role as managers of the policy development process.170 A weakness 
of this theory is the difficulty researchers have identifying how influences are 
attributable to individuals. In this case study the variable of changing ministry 
personnel is held constant such that other variables can be investigated 
independently. In this investigation, the thesis assumes Ministry officials acted 
consistently in the MAR and Bill 14 policy processes. 
Policy discourse theory postulates that a policy frame is resistant to 
change because many of the actors have similar perspectives on the policy 
problem and its solution. The frame changes through the introduction of new 
ideas to the discourse either to augment the existing frame or to transform the 
frame with more substantial change. Policy actors determine their interests and 
preferences through this discourse. Using this theory, Bhatia and Coleman 
research suggests that the more pluralistic the policy community, the less likely 
substantive policy change is possible while highly integrated communities were 
more likely to make substantive change.171 
In this case study, the addition of the Ministry to the policy community in 
2001 changed the policy discourse. The Ministry championed the idea of 
provincial control over local governments. The policy community in 1995 did not 
include the Ministry and because the sponsoring party to Bill M222 had no 
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political power to effect change, certain policy actors such as the Urban 
Development Institute and other commercial interests were absent from the policy 
discourse.172 The local government policy community was quite integrated in 
1995 and therefore using policy discourse theory it was more likely to make 
substantial policy change but it did not. The idea that additional local autonomy 
could solve the policy problem of provincial downloading had been discussed in 
the policy community for many years. However, the Ministry had not presented 
the value of the status quo or their perspective on provincial downloading. 
Moreover, the problem of provincial downloading had abated between 1996 and 
2001 with the improvement of province's finances. The province was prepared to 
address the policy problem with a legislative prohibition against provincial 
downloading rather than more municipal autonomy.173 Policy discourse theory 
suggests that a transformative policy discourse is more influential in an integrated 
policy community. In this case study, however, as the policy community became 
more pluralistic, particularly with the inclusion of the Ministry, Community Charter 
Council, Community Charter Business Coalition and members of the local 
governments themselves, the discourse became less transformative.174 
The simplest explanation for the overt influence of the Ministry is that, in 
the absence of professional advice in the development of Bill M222, the Ministry 
officials now had an opportunity to act as policy entrepreneurs and present their 
perspectives on local government autonomy.175 The new government's priorities 
were with much larger economic policy issues. Therefore, the new government 
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likely allowed Ministry's officials to re-define the policy problem. It also seems that 
the Ministry responsible for communities in the province has perhaps the most 
vested interest in less local government autonomy since granting communities 
more power necessarily takes power away from the Ministry itself. The mere 
suggestion that communities need more power from the province may be 
perceived as questioning the competence of the Ministry officials since it implies 
that the Ministry is itself not providing for the needs of communities. 
The UBCM defined local government's policy problem at the 1991 
convention and determined that the problem be solved with more local 
government autonomy. By contrast, the policy problem defined by the Ministry in 
2002 included "determining where powers need to be restricted in order to protect 
other interests."176 Internally, the province was concerned about conflict with 
other provincial mandates, such as environmental protection and economic 
development.177 The politically experienced Ministry officials likely understood the 
risks associated with more local autonomy and added this risk assessment to the 
internal provincial policy discourse. 
The Ministry's strongest specific interest involved its potential loss of 
power and control over local governments.178 The Ministry approves many of 
local government's bylaws. They also oversee local government's financial, land 
development and regulatory authorities. These issues help to justify the size and 
budget of the Ministry. The Ministry's concerns included the workability of the 
proposed new local government autonomy (autonomy understood from Bill 
M222); the capacity and maturity of local governments to make good policy 
decisions; and the loss of internal provincial resources associated with this loss of 
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power.179 As mentioned earlier in the literature review numerous scholars have 
written about bureaucratic theory and behavior. It has been suggested that 
bureaucracies act to maximize their budgets, staff complements and numbers of 
programs they operate. This secures their power and influence within government 
and the broader society.180 
In this case study greater local government autonomy would presumably 
lead to a reduction in the Ministry's budget and therefore its influence and size. 
Several interviewees suggested that the Ministry advocated for a much more 
conservative change to the level of local government autonomy than Bill M222.181 
It is also important to note that the Ministry led the policy processes for the NDP 
government regarding the Local Government Act. This act also provides for less 
autonomy than Bill M222 even though the UBCM has consistently called for more 
autonomy since 1991. Given that BMI14 allows for less autonomy than Bill M222, 
it is clear that the Ministry's professional agenda resulted in a reduction of local 
government autonomy outlined in Bill M222. 
Using the efficacy test of influence on the policymakers, it is likely that the 
Ministry had the greatest influence on changes to Bill M222's local autonomy. Bill 
14 does not provide for home rule, and the home rule provisions of Bill M222 
were not even included in the earliest iteration of Bill 14. 
Many of the issues raised by the Ministry reflected the difficulty of integrating the new 
Community Charter with other provincial statutes, the fear that new taxation regimes would 
conflict with existing provincial taxation and the concern that any change to the collective credit of 
the Municipal Finance Authority would result in lowering of the municipal bond rating by New York 
bond rating agencies. Municipal Finance Authority is the collective borrowing agency acting for all 
the municipalities within British Columbia in the capital markets of the world. This collective credit 
is predicated on the joint financial health of all the municipalities within British Columbia. It was 
suggested that a change to this status quo could cause a reduced bond rating which in turn would 
increase the cost of borrowing to all municipalities. 
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New Policy Actors: Business Interests 
The second change to the policy network and subsets was the attraction of 
new policy actors that resided outside the sphere of government to the 
policymaking process. The policy communities approach suggests that newly 
elected governments change the policy environment because new political 
influences are established in the policy environment after an election of a new 
political party. This results in different influences attributable to existing and new 
policy actors. For example, the provincial bureaucracy became a new actor in the 
opposition's policy subset after the opposition became government. Groups that 
were outside the policy community under one government, often for political or 
ideological reasons, find new influence under a more friendly government. 
The draft Community Charter, publicly presented in 2002, attracted new 
entrants into the local government policy community. An important example in 
this case study is the inclusion of the Community Charter Business Coalition. This 
coalition represented many business groups associated with commercial and 
residential land development and was established specifically to lobby the 
provincial government. It was not active in the local government policy community 
under the NDP government, but became very active after the public presentation 
of the draft Community Charter. Both the process of presenting a draft charter 
and subsequently the establishment of a Charter Council made up of 
representative policy actors encouraged new policy entrants to engage the 
government regarding their interests. This is in stark opposition to the tightly 
bound, narrowly focused and secretive policy enclave that developed Bill M222. 
Bill M222 was an outcome of the policy discussions that began at the 1991 
UBCM convention. The larger local government policy network supported the 
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1991 reform agenda.182 However, the Community Charter Bill 14 was a more 
pluralist public policy process and therefore attracted actors outside the local 
government policy network, including private sector business organizations. The 
reasons for this business engagement are varied. A growing number of citizens 
in British Columbia object to land development.183 This has frequently caused 
development delays, and resulted in higher costs to the development industry. 
Industry representatives suggest that as these pressures have grown, industry's 
influence on local government policymakers has decreased.184 The trend towards 
more pluralistic policy discussions, particularly with local land development, 
concerns the industry.185 Under the Local Government Act, the provincial 
government had some control over development issues. The province, for 
example, had to approve local government's development cost charge bylaws -
the costs charged to developers for offsite servicing obligations. This provincial 
oversight function has satisfied industry that development charges will be fair and 
standardized.186 
The construction industry voiced similar concerns regarding building 
regulation standardization.187 The province regulates building construction 
through the province's provincial building code. Local government's building 
bylaws must follow the provincial building code. These groups indicated that 
increasing local government autonomy could risk these provincial standards and 
increase their costs.188 
The reform paper was voted on and passed by the 1991 UBCM convention, 
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Local autonomy was also a concern of commercial businesses. Some 
businesses are controversial, causing perceived or real social problems. Local 
governments must deal with the problems these enterprises generate, which 
increase costs for communities. For example, escort services cause additional 
policing costs. Local governments have attempted, without success, to restrict 
certain types of businesses for social and financial reasons. However, restricting 
certain business activities through zoning is legal.189 The business community 
was concerned that additional autonomy would include the prohibition of certain 
types of businesses presently permitted within the commercial zoning context.190 
Based on the evidence, the first draft community charter included this prohibition 
authority, but the province excluded it from the final charter. The business 
community used their political influence with the policymakers to protect their 
existing interests. 
The Vancouver Board of Trade, and McCarthy Tetrault, legal counsel for 
the Community Charter Business Coalition produced papers warning of the 
dangers of local government autonomy and encouraged the province to maintain 
strong control over local governments.191 The Community Charter Business 
Coalition formed specifically to lobby for less autonomy for local governments 
and, based on the research presented in this paper, was quite successful in its 
efforts. 
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From the evidence, both the provincial bureaucracy and the business 
community's inclusion and activism in the local government policy community 
resulted in effective influence to reduce local government's autonomy. Although 
the Liberal party proposed Bill M222 with its substantially increased autonomy in 
1995, the party's new role as government and these new powerful policy actors 
caused the substantial erosion of autonomy in Bill 14. Other factors also 
influenced the government policymakers to change their earlier intentions of Bill 
M222. 
Ongoing UBCM Influence 
The UBCM had established a reform agenda in 1991 in response to 
provincial downloading and reductions in fiscal support for local governments. 
Over the period 1991 to 2003 the UBCM lobbied consistently for more local 
autonomy to solve these pressing policy problems. The provincial government, 
however, found other methods of reducing the severity of these policy problems. 
In 2003, they legislated a restriction against provincial downloading, stopped the 
reduction of fiscal transfers to local governments and made incremental 
increases in legislated local autonomy.192 A few select UBCM members had 
substantial access to the policymakers during the development of Bill M222.193 
They again had unprecedented access to the policymakers during the 
development of Bill 14 in 2002-3 through the Community Charter Council and 
their ongoing contacts with the government.194 Yet, they failed to influence the 
policymakers in government sufficiently to grant local government meaningful 
local autonomy. There is no clear explanation for the failure on the part of the 
192Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 218-222. 
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UBCM to obtain meaningful local autonomy for local governments. The only 
explanation is that the UBCM did not have the necessary influence over the 
policymakers to make the desired legislative changes. Although the UBCM was a 
significant policy actor in both the 1995 and 2002-3 policy communities, their 
influence was minimal with respect to obtaining local government autonomy that 
approaches home rule. 
Macro-Political Changes and Political Maneuvering 
Changes to policy communities can be caused by other macro-political 
variables such as changing political circumstances and partisan political 
maneuvering. Compared to the 1990's, the financial positions of the provincial 
and federal governments had improved substantially by 2003. The UBCM agenda 
for reform of 1991 was a reaction to service downloading of provincial 
governments. In 2001, the new Liberal government promised not to download 
additional services to local governments in their "New Era" election platform. 
Although no direct downloading to local governments took place in the early 
years of the Liberals, provincial core ministry reviews had the effect of reducing 
certain public services that in turn put pressure on local governments to operate 
similar services. This reduced the urgency to solve local government's policy 
problems. Some policy scholars suggest a precondition for substantial policy 
change is the need for a broad consensus within the policy network or sub-
government that the policy problem is severe.195 The redefinition of local 
government's problems is one explanation of why Bill 14 was incremental. 
Bhatia and Coleman,736. 
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Political manoeuvring takes place on a daily basis in the provincial 
legislative arena. Opposition parties make statements, propose policies and 
generally engage the media and the government on the issues of the day. They 
also respond to the policy positions of the other parties in an attempt to win 
political advantage. These events change the dynamics of the policy network by 
emphasizing one issue over another. Other members of the policy network act 
similarly to influence the policymakers. The government defends its actions, 
proposes new policies and actions and engages the media on the daily issues. 
Much of this activity attracts media attention with the purpose of informing the 
voting public. The daily political agenda changes with the issues raised by the 
media. The government and their opposition manoeuvre to take political 
advantage and be perceived by the public to be worthy of their vote. 
Political maneuvering played a part in the actions of both the NDP and 
Liberal governments regarding Bill M222 and Bill 14. For example, the 
development and tabling of Bill M222 could have numerous partisan 
explanations. It appears that Bill M222 was a hasty and skeletal approach to local 
government legislative reform.196 This is partly due to the adversarial environment 
in which the Liberal opposition party found itself within a government dominated 
policy network; their limited policy resources; and the small and non-pluralistic 
attributes of the policy actors developing Bill M222. 
There is also evidence that the Liberal opposition was concerned in 1995 
that the NDP government was improving their relationship with local governments 
through the Protocol of Recognition and developed Bill M222 as a response.197 
The intention of Bill M222 was to solidify the Liberals political support with local 
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governments, especially given Gordon Campbell's long history of support for 
additional local government autonomy. On the other hand, the NDP government 
may have supported the Protocol of Recognition to offset the negativity 
generated by their cuts to local government grants. The NDP were likely aware of 
Gordon Campbell's affinity with local governments and tried to undermine that 
support by building a better relationship with local governments. 
Leadership in the policy arena is an important method of attracting political 
support. Local elected officials are not homogenous in their support of either of 
the two major parties. Indeed, civic leaders may be supporters of either party.198 
These constituencies need positive policy examples to proselytize for their party 
of choice. The policy issues of importance to most local government elected 
officials included the manner and extent of local government's authority and their 
ability to solve community problems locally. 
Opposition parties are also free to act in a less accountable manner when 
they propose legislation because there is virtually no chance of the legislation 
succeeding without government support.199 Election planning may also have 
played a role in the timing of Bill M222. An election call was expected in 1995, 
therefore the opposition needed to present their best policy proposals as election 
marketing. 
To describe political maneuvering and attribute causality is difficult given 
that most evidence is not transparent except to the internal government and 
opposition policy actors. These factors cannot act alone to affect change but can 
influence the policymakers and their policy strategies over time. The reduction in 
the perceived severity of local government's policy problem likely did have a large 
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effect in reducing the amount of local government autonomy in Bill 14. This 
change in the problem reduced the government's incentive to grant more 
autonomy and allowed the voices for less autonomy to have more influence. 
With respect to the efficacy of each factor's political influence, the Ministry 
of Communities, Aboriginal and Women's Services did not need help from other 
sources of influence to reduce local government autonomy. It acted 
independently to remove home rule from Bill 14 and controlled the process of Bill 
14's policy development. The Community Charter Business Coalition acted within 
the local government policy community to affect changes in Bill 14 that benefited 
their interests. The evidence suggests that the Coalition also had substantial 
influence on Bill 14. The UBCM had little influence in developing the local 
autonomy in Bill 14 that reflected the earlier home rule in Bill M222. The changes 
to the policy problem (provincial downloading) and the larger macro-political 
changes to the policy environment had substantial influence on the policymakers. 
Political maneuvering may have had a high level of influence on the policy 
makers. All these factors, except the UBCM, were effective in influencing the 
policymakers and could have acted independently to exercise that influence. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
In British Columbia during the 1990s, local governments attempted to 
obtain provincially legislated home rule. In 1995 a private member's Bill M222 
entitled "Community Charter" failed to pass the provincial legislature. This bill 
included home rule for local governments. In 2004 the British Columbia 
legislature enacted Bill 14 also entitled "Community Charter". Bill 14 did not 
include home rule; however, it did include incremental improvements to local 
government autonomy. The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: what 
factors explain the changes from Bill M222-1995 to Bill 14-2004? The factors 
under examination include changes in the policy network membership, the 
relative political influence of certain policy actors, contextual change to the policy 
environment, and changes to the nature of the policy problem. In order to 
determine the significance of these factors, the study examined several related 
questions: what effect does moving from opposition to government have on policy 
change? Can changes in the policy network and policy sub-system explain these 
policy changes? Moreover, can this case study generalize explanations for policy 
change when parties move from opposition to government? These questions 
speak to the very heart of our understanding of policymaking, the appropriate 
exercising of political power and its ultimate impact on policy outcomes. 
In the course of this case study numerous independent variables were 
investigated to determine their influence on the dependent variables (Bills M222 
and 14). Many of the attributes of the two dependent variables are similar. Both 
were called "Community Charter", both were advocated by the same individuals 
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and political party and both proposed to accomplish more autonomy for local 
governments. 
The factors that explain the changes to these two bills are the inclusion of 
two important and influential policy actors into the policy network, one to the sub-
government and the other to the larger policy network. The Ministry of 
Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services joined the policy community 
through the election of the Liberal Party in 2001. Until then the Liberal opposition 
policy subset excluded the Ministry for partisan reasons. Evidence indicates that 
the Ministry held views, ideas and norms that were conservative regarding radical 
policy change. The Ministry was also in a conflict of interest regarding Bill M222's 
proposal for more local autonomy. The Ministry's inclusion in the policy 
community in 2001 influenced the policymakers and reduced local government's 
autonomy in Bill 14. 
The province's consultative policy process attracted numerous business 
groups and associations into the network resulting from the public presentation of 
the draft community charter in May 2002. These groups were lead by the 
Community Charter Business Coalition, a coalition with a broad and 
encompassing business membership, including organizations such as the British 
Columbia Chambers of Commerce, Business Council of British Columbia, British 
Columbia Construction Association, Retail Council of Canada and others. 
Evidence indicates that this group had substantial influence on the policy makers 
and reduced local government autonomy particularly on matters of business self-
interest. These groups were transparent with their positions and policy outcomes 
making the evidence clear regarding their influence on the policymakers. 
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Other explanatory factors include macro-political circumstances and the 
severity of the policy problem. In 1995, the province's financial circumstances 
were difficult resulting in substantial budget deficits. The provincial government 
reduced grants to municipalities and downloaded service responsibilities as a 
result of its financial position. This caused an number of challenges for local 
governments and generated a call for more autonomy to help manage these 
challenges. Local governments saw the policy problem as severe. In 2001, the 
new Liberal government promised not to download additional services to local 
governments in their "New Era" election platform. The economic outlook had also 
improved causing less stress on the provincial government. The macro-political 
circumstances had changed as the general economy started to improve. The 
policy problem had also changed. The problem of provincial downloading had 
abated and the drivers for these provincial actions had lessened. Some members 
of the policy network saw the policy problem as less severe than in 1995. This 
lessened the likelihood of substantial or radical policy change. These two factors, 
macro-political change and the changing perception of the severity of the policy 
problem worked to reduce local autonomy in Bill 14. 
Institutional arrangements have influence on policy outcomes. In this case 
study a number of these arrangements changed in the course of the nine years 
under study. The most significant change was the Liberal party's move from 
opposition to government in 2001. In 1995, the party was in opposition when they 
presented Bill M222 for legislative consideration. The same individuals that 
championed that bill became the government decision makers in 2001, notably 
Gordon Campbell and Ted Nebbeling. Throughout those nine years, the Liberals 
made the same rhetorical statements regarding the need for more local 
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government autonomy. The 1996 Liberal's New Era election platform stated that 
a Liberal government would "[p]ass a Community Charter to outlaw provincial 
government 'offloading' of costs onto municipal government, and to give local 
governments greater autonomy and better planning tools to reduce pressure on 
property tax."200 The advent of political power changed the approach the Liberals 
took regarding local autonomy. This factored into the reason local government 
autonomy was eroded in Bill 14. 
Political manoeuvring takes place daily in the provincial legislative arena. 
Opposition parties make statements, propose policies and generally engage the 
media and the government on the issues of the day. Other members of the policy 
network also act to influence the policymakers. The government defends its 
actions, proposes new policies and actions and engages the media. Much of this 
activity attracts media attention with the purpose of informing the voting public. 
The government and the opposition manoeuvred to take political advantage and 
be perceived by the public to be worthy of their vote. 
Bill M222 was presented to the legislature under the same political 
manoeuvring. The 1996 election was due to be called in 1995, therefore the 
opposition Liberals wanted to present publicly their intentions if they were in 
government.201 Evidence also suggests that the presentation of Bill M222 was a 
reaction to the NDP's offer to recognize local governments as an order of 
government, which they did in 1996 through the Protocol of Recognition and Bill 
31. Discussions between the government and UBCM were ongoing throughout 
1995 on this matter. The NDP government may have been engaging in similar 
200New Era Document, (accessed 9/14/08). 
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political manoeuvring by offering the Protocol of Recognition in the first place, 
recognizing that Gordon Campbell was a respected member of the local 
government policy network. Conjecture could be endless. The evidence collected 
supports the first contention and for the purpose of this thesis confirms that 
political manoeuvring can influence policymakers. In this case, the Liberal 
opposition "trumped" the government's initiative for a Protocol of Recognition with 
the presentation of Bill M222. This leads to us to question the seriousness of Bill 
M222's intentions. Regardless, the thesis concludes that political manoeuvring 
was an influential factor on the final policy outcome. 
Numerous public policy approaches were used to understand the policy 
influences in the course of this case study. The policy communities and networks 
approach was used to determine what happened in the local government policy 
community in 1995 (Bill M222) and again in 2002-3 (Bill 14). The evidence 
indicated that two groups not present in 1995 community were very influential in 
2002. These are the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services 
and the Community Charter Business Coalition. Through the investigation of each 
of these group's ideas, norms and values it was determined that they did not 
support additional local government autonomy. Bureaucratic theory suggests the 
Ministry supported reduced local government autonomy because it needed to 
protect its budget and power. The business coalition favoured provincial control 
over local governments, thereby allowing less local regulation over business and 
protecting its self interest. 
In determining the reason why home rule did not survive in Bill 14, the 
policy discourse and policy frame approach was used indicating that the severity 
of the policy problem had changed with the passage of time. The transformative 
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discourse instituted in 1991 by the UBCM was less urgent by 2002. An 
augmentative discourse resulted and supported the status quo or the "dominant 
policy frame". The macro-political circumstances had changed and the Liberals 
suggested an alternative solution to the policy problem of provincial downloading 
through a prohibition against the practice. 
Policy discourse and institutionalist theory used by Bhatia and Coleman 
suggests that the stronger the pluralistic interest groups are the less likelihood of 
substantial policy change.202 In this case study as the policy process became 
more pluralistic the discourse became more augmentative, a development that 
supports this conclusion. 
The literature was reviewed on the matter of policy change. Since this 
case study does not represent a radical policy change but only incremental 
change, the literature was helpful in determining why radical change did not take 
place. The transformative discourse for more radical local autonomy could not 
sustain itself over time given the powerful influences against such changes. 
One aspect of this case study that is not widely reported in other studies is 
the influence factor of partisan political manoeuvring on policymaking. 
Policymaking is usually driven by a particular policy problem. However, there may 
be tactical political advantages in the timing, presentation and content of any 
given policy. This was the case of Bill M222. When studying policy changes it 
may be necessary to investigate the timing and content of a policy for any aspect 
of partisan political manoeuvring before determining a policy's influences. 
Given the findings of this thesis, further case study research to determine if 
there is a demonstrated correlation between policy change and the 
Bhatia and Coleman, 715-739 
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characteristics of a policy community would add to our understanding of 
policymaking. In this case study, the possibility for policy change was reduced as 
the process became more pluralistic. As our society becomes more engaged in 
governance this tendency towards augmentative discourse may reduce our ability 
to enact changes. This possibility may have far reaching implications for policy 
development and society as a whole. 
Access to provincial information (cabinet briefing documents) would result 
in a better understanding of the internal provincial policy processes and help 
clarify how internal provincial policy is developed. Access may also allow the 
discovery of how and why home rule disappeared in the first iteration of Bill 14. 
This thesis adds to our understanding of public policy development. The 
case study is a particular set of circumstances regarding the important issue of 
local autonomy. It outlines the influences that were present in the development of 
Bills M222 and 14 and uses the policy communities and networks approach to 
investigate these influences. In the future, this study and others like it will allow 
citizens to better understand how and why government policy choices are made. 
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